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Abstract
This thesis compiles three papers on diﬀerent topics in blockchain-based information systems. The first
paper presents a blockchain-based information system to reduce the costs and improve the customer
experience in the Know-Your-Customer (KYC) process that financial institutions are obliged to conduct.
The system shows how to use blockchain technology to reduce and share out the cost of the KYC
process among a consortium of financial institutions without compromising the privacy of customers and
institutions. The second paper improves the system presented in the first paper by combining it with
a distributed database, which allows for a more flexible and decentralized architecture. Further, the
improvements in the second paper allow for dynamic updates in the status of the customers. The third
paper revises the existing assumption that states that the probability of miners in the bitcoin system
finding a valid block is constant within each block and governed by the Poisson distribution. By means
of a multinomial logit model, the third paper shows that the probability of a miner finding a valid
block increases with the time elapsed since the miner started mining the block. Further, the third paper
postulates that a possible explanation for this phenomenon is that the probability of miners in the bitcoin
system finding a valid block is governed by the negative hypergeometric distribution.
iii
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Introduction
1
Introduction
The seminal work by Nakamoto (2008) introduced the concept of “bitcoin”, an electronic currency and
economic system based on a technology that has been given the name of “blockchain”. The main innova-
tion introduced by this system was that it oﬀered a solution to the “double-spending” problem that was
intrinsic to previous decentralized, digital currencies. This problem emerged from the fact that without
a third party or central authority overlooking the system, users of electronic currencies could spend the
same units of the currency twice, engaging in fraudulent behavior. Nakamoto (2008) designed the bitcoin
system to be sustained by nodes that communicate with each other in a peer-to-peer network. Some of
these nodes are called “miners” in the blockchain jargon. Miners conduct a trial-and-error process that
can result in either success or failure. Success in this process results in a new block (a piece of infor-
mation about the new transactions that are accepted in the system) being appended to the blockchain
(a ledger containing all the past information regarding the transactions made in the system). This new
block contains a transaction that awards the winning miner a reward in the form of bitcoins. These
bitcoins compensate the mining costs of the miner, which are the fixed cost of the mining hardware and
the variable electricity costs associated with the mining activity. In order to conduct this trial-and-error
process, miners devote hash power to the network. The higher the hash power that a miner devotes
to the system, the higher her probability of success in the mining process. The way Nakamoto (2008)
suggested solving the double-spending problem was by making the cost of conducting a double-spending
attack so high that the expected return of a double-spending attack would result in a negative monetary
amount. Since a dishonest miner wishing to conduct a double-spending attack on the network needs
to carry out the trial-and-error mining process faster than all the honest miners together, the dishonest
miner needs to devote more hash power to the network than all the honest miners, which implies a very
high monetary cost for the dishonest miner. The cost of such an attack is so high that it is expected to
not be compensated by the amount in bitcoins that can be spent twice in a double-spending attack.
By solving the double-spending problem, Nakamato (2008) was able to propose an economic system
that was anonymous, fully peer-to-peer, and that required no trusted third party in order to properly
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function. Further, this system was able to create and distribute value without the need of centralized
third parties. Closely following the publication of Nakamoto’s work (2008), bitcoin drew the attention and
admiration of libertarians and so-called crypto-anarchists, since—as described by Karlstrøm (2014)—it
allowed them to escape the centralized, highly regulated traditional economic system. For many hackers
and criminals, bitcoin was also attractive, since it represented a way to conduct illicit activities in an
anonymous manner. In fact, Foley et.al. (2019) show that in 2009 the percentage dollar volume of illegal
bitcoin user transactions reached 85 percent of the whole dollar volume of bitcoin user transactions. Bit-
coin seemed to fulfill the prediction made by Milton Friedman in 1999 with regard to the type of money
that was required if the Internet was to unleash its real potential: “I think that the Internet is going to
be one of the major forces for reducing the role of government. The one thing that’s missing, but that
will soon be developed, is a reliable e-cash, a method whereby on the Internet you can transfer funds
from A to B without A knowing B or B knowing A. [...] That kind of thing will develop on the Internet
and that will make it even easier for people using the Internet. Of course, it has its negative side. It
means the gangsters, the people who are engaged in illegal transactions, will also have an easier way to
carry on their business.” (Friedman, 1999). During the initial years following its introduction, financial
institutions, governments, and respected economists would not only not back bitcoin, they would come
out clearly against it. Examples of such opposition include Krugman (2013), whose work bears the title
“BitCoin is evil”, Stross (2013), whose work is entitled “Why I want Bitcoin to die in a fire”, and Basu
(2014), of the World Bank stating that “Bitcoin is a naturally occurring Ponzi scheme”. Kurgman (2013),
Stross (2013), and Basu (2014) criticize many aspects of the bitcoin system, including the electricity
costs required to keep it secure, its anonymity, its volatility, the lack of regulation, the impossibility of
implementing monetary policy on the system, and the deflationary aspects of the currency. In this vein,
and representing well the negative opinion of bitcoin, Nouriel Rubini stated that “Bitcoin isn’t a currency.
It is a Ponzi game and a conduit for criminal/illegal activities.” (Roubini, 2014).
However, and despite these statements and analyses, both scholars and practitioners realized that blockchain
technology had certain aspects that could be interesting to incorporate into other systems. Such aspects
included the ability to create and transmit value between peers in a decentralized manner, the ability to
achieve consensus without the need of a third party, the ability to have immutable, distributed ledgers to
store information, and the ability to design new forms of corporate organization—that is to say, decen-
tralized autonomous organizations, whose governance rules are specified in the blockchain (Beck, 2018).
Further, they realized that blockchains can also contain “smart contracts”, which are programs stored
on the blockchain that run as implemented without any risk of downtime, censorship, or fraud (Buterin,
2014). Additionally, as stated by Lindman et al. (2017), blockchain technology was recognized as having
the potential to become a valuable enabler of economic and social transactions, for instance as a general-
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purpose digital asset ownership record. Beck et al. (2017) describe how the financial sector has been
leading the way in developing blockchain applications and business models, but also how companies in
industries such as shipping, transportation, healthcare, and entertainment are actively using blockchain
applications to coordinate the movement of products, facilitate the creation of e-health records, and
securely manage original entertainment content. Summarizing, after the backlash from economists and
institutions against bitcoin in the years following its introduction, many properties of the blockchain
are being used in 2019 to improve processes in existing industries, allow competitors to collaborate in
certain aspects of their business processes, and increase economic growth by enabling new business models.
In this context, Chapter 1 presents a blockchain-based information system that uses blockchain tech-
nology (called “distributed ledger technology” (DLT) in the article due to the lack of consensus regarding
the nomenclature back when the chapter was written) to reduce the cost of the Know-Your-Customer
(KYC) due diligence process conducted by financial institutions. The KYC process is a highly regulated
verification process that needs to be carried out by financial institutions before starting to work with any
client. This process is very similar across all the financial institutions operating under the same jurisdic-
tion, occurs in a parallel or consecutive manner, and generates costs of up to USD 500 million per year
per bank (Thompson Reuters, 2016). In the system presented in Chapter 1, the KYC verification process
is only conducted once for each customer, regardless of the number of financial institutions with which
that customer intends to work. In this system, the result of the KYC process (a document accepting or
rejecting the client as a viable client according to the jurisdiction) can be securely and privately shared
by customers with all the financial institutions that they intend to work with, avoiding the need for each
single financial institution to repeat the KYC process. This system allows for eﬃciency gains, cost reduc-
tion, improved customer experience, and increased transparency throughout the process of onboarding a
customer. Chapter 1 contributes to the literature by presenting a use case of blockchain technology to
address an existing problem in the financial industry. Further, it shows how the role of economic incen-
tives is crucial for the design and correct implementation of blockchain-based systems and how the design
of the incentives structure plays a vital role in the properties that emerge from blockchain-based systems.
While the piece makes a solid contribution to the literature and was published under Parra-Moyano and
Ross (2017), it is a static system that allows for no updates in the status of a customer, requires a central
authority (the national regulator) to conduct compensations between financial institutions, and needs
the customers of financial institutions to be responsible for the handling and maintenance of their own
documents, which increases their workload compared to the KYC case without a blockchain.
Chapter 2 addresses the issues left open in Chapter 1. Specifically, it presents a system that makes
it possible for financial institutions to dynamically update information related to their customers and
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disseminate this information among all the financial institutions that participate in the system. Further,
the system presented in Chapter 2 incorporates the distributed database architecture of Siegenthaler
and Birman (2009a and 2009b) into the design of the KYC system. The incorporation of a distributed
database architecture to securely and privately store the data of the customers outside of a blockchain
significantly increases the flexibility of the system presented in Chapter 1 (it implies a much simpler
architecture) while keeping the privacy standard intact. Further, it eliminates the need for the central
authority to manage the payments, something that was required in the system presented in Chapter 1.
Chapter 2 also presents the programmed artifact described in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, and makes it
available for scholars and practitioners to use for their own ends. The major contribution of Chapter 2
lies in its combination of the distributed database architecture of Siegenthaler and Birman (2009a and
2009b) and the blockchain technology introduced by Nakamaoto (2008). Using a distributed database
architecture to privately store data and using the public blockchain to manage the reading permissions on
the database significantly reduces the complexity and costs of the system while maintaining its benefits
intact. Chapter 2 will be published as Parra-Moyano, Thoroddsen, and Ross (2019).
Chapter 3 studies the bitcoin protocol, which is the inspiration behind all the proof-of-work blockchain
protocols that sustain blockchain-based systems. Thus far, it has been assumed in the literature that
the success of the mining trial-and-error process follows the Poisson distribution. From this assumption
it emerges that the success probability of a miner remains constant throughout the mining process for
each block. Chapter 3 describes a series of observations that contradict this assumption, stating that
the probability of a miner finding a valid block increases with the time that elapses since the moment at
which that miner starts mining a particular block. Chapter 3 postulates that a possible explanation for
this phenomenon is that the probability of a miner finding a valid block in the bitcoin network (the rate
of successful trial-and-error mining processes) is governed by the negative hypergeometric distribution.
In order to test if the probability of winning increases with time, Chapter 3 models the mining process
as a race, in which miners compete to find the next valid block, and by means of a multinomial logit
model with the same structure as the one used by Bolton and Chapman (1986) shows that we should
reject the idea that time does not increase the winning probability of miners for a particular block in a
manner that is proportional to a miner’s size. The dataset used to compute the model requires many
assumptions since the econometrician cannot observe many of the variables required for the computation
of the model and therefore needs to infer them. For this reason, and given the fact that the result of this
chapter might have serious implications for proof-of-work systems, Chapter 3 concludes with a call to the
mining community to publish the data that they have and that the econometrician cannot observe, in
order to facilitate a definite answer to the clarification of this phenomenon.
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Summarizing, this thesis contributes to the literature by studying, designing, and developing a blockchain-
based system that addresses an open issue in the banking industry. By doing so, this thesis presents how
to use economic incentives to design a blockchain system such that all the agents in the system behave as
they are meant to behave. Additionally, this thesis makes an in-depth study of bitcoin mining, showing
that despite the useful attributes of blockchains, some of its fundamental aspects might have not yet been
fully understood—neither by scholars nor by practitioners—and that further reflection and analysis is
required before blockchain technology is mature enough to unleash the economic growth that it clearly
promises.
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Essay 1
KYC Optimization Using Distributed
Ledger Technology
KYC Optimization Using Distributed Ledger
Technology
José Parra-Moyano
University of Zurich
Switzerland
jose.parramoyano@uzh.ch
Omri Ross
University of Copenhagen
Denmark
omri@di.ku.dk
November 2017
Abstract
The know-your-customer (KYC) due diligence process is outdated and generates costs of up to USD
500 million per year per bank. The authors propose a new system, based on distributed ledger technology
(DLT), that reduces the costs of the core KYC verification process for financial institutions and improves
the customer experience. In the proposed system, the core KYC verification process is only conducted
once for each customer, regardless of the number of financial institutions with which that customer intends
to work. Thanks to DLT, the result of the core KYC verification can be securely shared by customers
with all the financial institutions that they intend to work with. This system allows for eﬃciency gains,
cost reduction, improved customer experience, and increased transparency throughout the process of
onboarding a customer.
Keywords: Blockchain, Information Systems, KYC, DLT
Note : A version of this paper has been published as Parra Moyano, J. and Ross, O., KYC
Optimisation Using Distributed Ledger Technology, Business & Information Systems Engineering, 59
(6), 411-423, 2017.
1.1 Introduction
The increased regulatory cost incurred due to the know-your-customer (KYC) verification process in
banking is one of the largest challenges that the banking sector is currently experiencing. The yearly
direct costs that financial institutions need to cover in order to meet their obligations in terms of KYC
are estimated, in a recent survey by Thompson Reuters (2016), to average USD 60 million. This cost can
be further augmented by the fines levied on financial institutions due to their misconduct with regard
to anti-money-laundering (AML) and KYC regulations. According to the head of Strategy and Risk
at the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission, “KYC and AML stand out [for a bank to] as a
pretty significant ineﬃciency and problem case [...] tallying up the fines [for a bank to] 10 billion or
more US dollars” (Benedict N. Nolens, at the MIT Technology Review Emtech conference, 2016). And
the sources of additional costs do not stop here, as financial institutions are not allowed to conduct any
business with corporate entities that have not yet completed the full KYC process. Since that process is
long, and tends to lengthen with the size of the corporate entity concerned, the starting point of a given
business relationship between a customer and a financial institution is usually delayed, which represents
opportunity costs for both parties. Indeed, corporations need to verify all their subsidiaries before being
granted KYC verification, and this is a laborious task for them. Therefore, it comes as little surprise that
the abovementioned survey indicates that 89% of customers do not have a good KYC experience.
The aim of this paper is to propose a new approach to the KYC verification process. We introduce
a system, based on DLT, that proposes a solution to the increased costs of the KYC process and the
lack of customer satisfaction. The key reason for using DLT is that it allows us to observe the KYC
cost structure at an aggregate level for all the financial institutions operating in a jurisdiction and to
tackle the ineﬃciencies that emerge from the duplicated conduct of similar tasks by all participating
institutions (i.e., DLT allows us to render the execution of duplicated tasks completely unnecessary, and
this delivers far greater cost savings than would any eﬀort to merely make these duplicated tasks more
cost eﬃcient). Specifically, DLT enables the creation of a chronological, decentralized, interbank ledger
in which financial institutions that need to conduct the same KYC verification tasks for that customer
can verify the result of the process that has already been conducted for that customer, thus avoiding
conducting duplicated KYC verification tasks. Moreover, the use of DLT allows the cost of the KYC
process to be shared proportionally among the financial institutions that work with a specific customer.
In particular, the system allows customers to carry out the full KYC process with only one financial
institution, and later on to share the result of that KYC process with any other financial institution that
they intend to work with. The DLT acts as a “single point of truth”, understood as the only source of
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information, accepted by any involved party should conflict occur.
The main improvement of the proposed system over the current system is that the KYC process only
needs to be carried out once by each customer, rather than once by each institution working with that
customer. This reduces the aggregated cost of the KYC process as a whole in a jurisdiction without com-
promising the security of the system, respects the privacy of the participants, and increases transparency
in case of a conflict. Additionally, the use of the public key of a customer as a reference point for an
immutable exchange of information across participating institutions serves as a basis for interbank collab-
oration. The use of DLT reduces the aggregate cost of KYC and this is the main conceptual contribution
of this paper. In Section 1.2 we explain the KYC process, and relate it to work that has already been
carried out with regard to optimizing KYC costs. Section 1.3 oﬀers an overview of DLT and examines
its potential for resolving the current problems of the KYC process. In Section 1.4 we show how we have
applied design science research to solve the problem at hand. In Section 1.5 we describe and analyze the
prototype solution and the economic mechanisms that need to be put in place in order to ensure a well
functioning system. In Section 1.6 we discuss three possible implementations of this solution. Section 1.7
concludes.
1.2 The Current KYC Process
The KYC process is part of the growing regulation of the financial industry that began with the Money
Laundering Control Act of 1986 (see USA 1986) and has been growing extensively since in the form of fur-
ther, ongoing regulation aimed at precluding either money laundering or the funding of terrorist activity
(see USA 1988, 1992, 1994, 1998, 2001, 2004). Financial institutions are obliged by regulators to onboard
their customers before conducting any activity with them, in order to avoid working with customers
that pursue either of the aforementioned illicit activities. The KYC process consists of an exchange of
documents between the customer and the financial institution that intend to work together. The process
includes the collection of basic identity information from all beneficiaries to check for illicit activity and
“politically exposed persons.” The process also includes risk management with regard to onboarding new
customers, the monitoring of transactions, and specific customer policies for banks. The process is costly
for financial institutions and may expose them to large fines if it is not conducted in accordance with
the existing regulations (e.g., HSBC was fined USD 1.92 billion when it was discovered that Mexico’s
Sinaloa cartel and Colombia’s Norte del Valle cartel had laundered USD 881 million through the bank
(Viswanatha and Wolf 2012), and ING Bank paid USD 619 million in fines for violating sanctions against
a variety of countries (Freifeld 2012)).
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The KYC process is initiated when a customer intends to work with a financial institution. Chrono-
logically, the customer and the financial institution agree on the terms of a relationship. Then, the
customer sends the required documents to the financial institution in order to enable the institution to
conduct the KYC verification process. The financial institution analyzes the documents and generates an
additional, internal document that serves as the certification that assures regulators that this customer
has been either validated or rejected and that the KYC process has been properly conducted. This pro-
cess is repeated every time the customer intends to work with a new financial institution. In the current
setting, every time a customer initiates a relationship with a financial institution the costs of the KYC
verification process recur. Figure 1 shows an example case that illustrates the process that occurs when
a customer intends to work with three diﬀerent financial institutions. This example case shows how, for
this single customer, the exchange of documents and the core KYC validation must be undertaken three
times, such that the total costs that are generated by this customer are three times those of a single
KYC process. At this point, it is important to diﬀerentiate between the “core KYC verification process”,
which is the minimum KYC verification that all financial institutions are obliged by law to conduct,
and additional, bank-specific processes. While further documentation can be asked for by each financial
institution to create an “additional aura of information” for every customer, our solution focuses solely
on the core KYC verification process, which is that shared by all the financial institutions in a jurisdiction.
The growth of regulation and changes to technology, as well as the financial crisis of 2007, have cre-
ated opportunities for companies, working in a field referred to as “regtech”, that aim to use technology
to improve the implementation of regulations. The term “regtech” comes from the combination of the
words “regulation” and “technology”. These opportunities are especially significant within the domain of
KYC (see Memminger et al. 2016; Arner et al. 2016). Arasa and Ottichilo (2015) conduct an analysis
of the cost of KYC based on the complexity level of the compliance required for the case of commercial
banks in Kenya, establishing four variables that explain 78.3% of the compliance requirements. Soni
and Duggal (2014) look into using big data analytics to reduce risk for institutions conducting the KYC
process. Colladon and Remondi (2017) work on diﬀerent approaches to using cluster analysis over a
network of customers and potential customers to identify suspicious financial operations and potentially
criminal activities. They do so by mapping relational data and using predictive models over an internal
transactions database involving data from over 33,000 financial operations. A survey of the latest regu-
latory requirements and a history of KYC and AML processes can be found in Ruce (2011). KYC can
be improved by, for example, improving auditors’ eﬀectiveness in assessing KYC and AML practices. A
case study in the context of Luxemburg is provided by Smet and Mention (2011) and reveals that audit
eﬀectiveness could be increased and information asymmetries reduced by an ISO standard for an internal
control assessment model for KYC. The current paper aims to deliver an additional improvement by using
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DLT to reduce the aggregate cost of the KYC process and distribute these lower costs proportionally
among the financial institutions participating in the system. Tackling the cost of the KYC process from
the aggregated perspective (i.e., as the sum of the individual costs of each financial institution) and using
DLT to reduce this aggregate cost is the main contribution of this paper.
Figure 1: Current process and cost structure of KYC
1.3 Blockchain Technology
DLT, such as blockchain technology, has gained prominence thanks to the widespread use of the cryp-
tocurrency Bitcoin. Bitcoin, introduced by Nakamoto (2008), was the first working cryptocurrency that
was not owned by a central authority. While DLT was originally used to provide a new way of creating
money and transferring it via the Internet, the technology can also be used to run and govern decen-
tralized systems by means of smart contracts. Smart contracts are computer protocols that facilitate,
verify, or enforce predefined clauses whenever a set of conditions is given. As described by Szabo (1997),
the intention of using smart contracts is to embed them in a whole range of properties that are valuable
and controlled by digital means. Since Nakamoto’s seminal work (Nakamoto 2008), new instances that
propose the use of DLT for a range of novel purposes have emerged. One of these is “Ethereum”, which
is a platform upon which whole decentralized applications may be run (see Wood 2016). Many papers,
including Peters and Panayi (2015) and Harvey (2016) discuss the blockchain from a technical perspective.
While transactions in the Bitcoin blockchain can include small scripts that define output spending con-
ditions, such as the requirement that a transaction be signed by two keys instead of one, the Ethereum
blockchain can be seen as a Turing complete virtual machine that can run code in several programming
languages and therefore run the smart contracts stored in it (see Glaser 2017).
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Glaser (2017) provides a solid ontological development of blockchain systems concepts and defines a
common set of blockchain components and relationships. This analysis serves as a framework and basis
for assessing the implications of blockchain solutions in an academic or economic context. Further, it
introduces the perspective of a pervasive decentralization of multiple layers of digital infrastructure by
blockchain technology. Specifically, Glaser (2017) defines and describes two layers of code – namely,
the fabric layer and the application layer. The term fabric layer denotes the system’s code base, which
embraces communication, the public-key infrastructure, the software that constructs and maintains the
database, and the execution environment of the system. Whoever develops and maintains the fabric
layer controls the functioning of the system. Ultimately, the fabric layer defines the governance type of
the system, which can be the only dimension of the fabric layer, and that can be public, permissioned,
or hybrid. Nevertheless, and as described by Glaser (2017), one important characteristic of blockchain
systems is that they do not allow for a diﬀerentiation between users and user management modules,
which implies that all the users have complete transparency when reading the transactions and the smart
contract code deployed.
The application layer comprises the application logic of the services implemented in the form of smart
contracts. The application layer encompasses three dimensions – namely, the ecosystem closedness, the
value linking, and the market type. The closedness of the ecosystem refers to the extent to which the
system needs to interact with other structures that are outside of the blockchain-based framework –
that is, with other trusted interfaces. Since the decentralization of control ends at the boundaries of the
blockchain-based system, the more closed the system is, the higher the leverage of a blockchain-based
solution. The value linking of the system refers to the intrinsic value of the tokens that are exchanged
between parties within the system. Glaser (2017) suggests four possible ways in which value is assigned
to the tokens of a system – namely, being the token a community currency, being seen as debt or equity
by the participants of the system, being backed by a commercial bank, or being backed by a central bank.
The last dimension of the application layer is market type, which describes the nature of the market in
which the blockchain-based solution is framed.
The European Security and Markets Authority (2016) sets out the possible benefits of DLT applied
to securities markets, discusses the possible shortcomings of and challenges to those benefits, and ana-
lyzes the relevant regulatory framework, with a focus on the main EU legislation relevant to potential
applications of DLT in securities markets. While the Authority focuses on the securities market, it
provides a DLT-solutions governance framework that can be very similar to the governance framework
required by the solution proposed in this paper. Specifically, it suggests that for the interbank context of
14
securities markets, a permission-based system can be of great value. Further, the Authority claims that
such a system would allow for governance of the interaction between the system’s participants, paying
special attention to the liabilities of each participant, correction mechanisms, and even penalties in the
case of infringement of the rules.
The European Central Bank (2012) defines and classifies virtual currency schemes based on their ob-
served characteristics. Depending on the interaction of the virtual currency schemes with traditional
money and the real economy, the Bank classifies them into three types: Type 1, which refers to closed
virtual currency schemes, which operate in the same way as do virtual currencies used in online gaming;
Type 2, virtual currency schemes with a unidirectional flow (usually an inflow), meaning that there exists
a conversion rate for purchasing the virtual currency; and Type 3, virtual currency schemes that have
bidirectional flows. The World Economic Forum (2016) analyzes the current phase of the disruptive
innovation work that is being conducted in terms of DLT in the financial sector, first looking at how
blockchain can reshape financial services, and then studying the role of financial institutions in building
digital identity. The Forum (2016) concludes that DLT can enable the design of new systems or improve
existing ones, by automating processes, reducing settlement time, reducing costs, reducing operational
risk, providing central authority disintermediation, and oﬀering real-time settlement. Egelund-Müller et
al. (2017) look into the construction of an automated financial system, with multiple counterparties, that
can run a variety of complex financial derivatives, including settlement, directly on DLT.
1.4 Design Science for KYC Optimization
According to Hevner et al. (2004), the objective of design science research (DSR) is to produce a tech-
nology based solution – in the form of a viable artifact – that solves a relevant business problem. In the
context of a hackathon organized at the IT University of Copenhagen, we collaborated with the Nordic
financial services group Nordea Bank AB to study the ineﬃciencies and costs related to the KYC process,
and analyzed if this process could be improved by means of a DLT-based solution. During these four days
we were confronted with the aforementioned reality of KYC ineﬃciencies, and transformed the existing
problematic into the following research question:
“Can a DLT-based solution reduce the cost of the KYC process for financial institutions and improve
the customer’s experience?”
In order to answer the research question and to design an eﬀective artifact that solves the problem
at hand within the corporate and regulatory context, we followed Hevner et al. (2004)’s DSR approach
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and focused on its three components (environment, IS research, and knowledge base). To strengthen the
utility, quality, and eﬃcacy of the proposed solution, we also considered the DSR process based on Peﬀers
et al. (2007)’s approach, which synthesizes design science processes from Information Systems (IS) and
other disciplines. This process is subdivided into five sub-steps: problem identification, objective defini-
tion, design and refinement of the artifact, demonstration of the artifact, and evaluation of the artifact.
The last three steps of the process need to be repeated recursively in a loop in order to gather feedback
from the environment and to refine the artifact according to that feedback. Both the approach and the
process are summarized in Figure 2.
Figure 2: DSR approach and DSR process. Source: Authors’ own illustration adapted from Hevner et
al. (2004) and Peﬀers et al. (2007)
Nordea Bank AB, representing the corporate environment, expressed the need for improvement in the
KYC process. They provided us with information concerning the applied diﬃculties of conducting the
process and pointed out its main pain sources. This enabled us to identify the problem and define our ob-
jective (previously formulated in the form of our research question): use a DLT-based solution to reduce
the cost of the KYC process for financial institutions and improve the customer’s experience. In order to
better understand the environment, we researched the existing KYC literature, paying special attention
to eﬀorts made in recent years to homogenize the KYC process and increase its eﬃciency without com-
promising security. Further, we held various exchanges with experts in the field (lawyers, practitioners,
and experts) regarding best practices in KYC. During these exchanges, it became clear that the system
proposed would need to fulfill three conditions if it was to be accepted by the participants. First, it
would need to enable its users to obtain a tamper-proof record of the KYC process in the case of conflict.
Second, it would have to reduce the costs of the current KYC process and distribute the remaining costs
in a proportionate manner among the participants of the system. Third, the system would need to not
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compromise the responsibility of banks with regard to conducting the KYC process. The combination
of the environment’s needs and our knowledge base constituted the grounds for our IS research, which
yielded the first version of our artifact, a version that we continued to refine over several months based
on ongoing dialog with, and feedback on the artifact from, KYC practitioners. With the problem iden-
tified and our objective defined (see above), the first design and refinement phase of the artifact was
conducted, taking into account the feedback and validation of KYC practitioners, as well as the insights
with regard to DLT from our knowledge base and the KYC experience from the environment. The first
demonstration of the artifact took place during the Nordic Blockchain Summit, at which it was awarded
first prize, receiving the majority of the votes of an audience of over 300 practitioners from the senior
corporate management level. The first evaluation phase involved various informal working sessions with
KYC practitioners who studied the artifact in terms of its relevance and viability, which helped us to
learn more about the specific requirements of the participants.
After the first design, refinement, demonstration, and evaluation phases, we undertook a second loop
of refinement, demonstration, and evaluation, following the DSR process described in Figure 2. The
second loop incorporated the feedback of five senior executives from the banking sector, a lawyer, and
two senior government oﬃcials, with whom we conducted several working sessions to explore various
implementation possibilities of the solution here proposed. Their feedback was related to the need for
interbank collaboration and for cooperation with the national regulator, as well as the need to launch
the process in a single, relatively small country (that can amend the required regulations eﬃciently and
quickly), to ensure that the system functions correctly. This feedback round made us aware of the need
to initially propose the solution at a national level, moving on to a solution that would encompass a
range of countries only later. From these working sessions, we also learned about the central role of
the national regulator as the cornerstone of such a DLT-based solution, about the need to identify the
individuals involved at each step of the KYC approval process, and about the importance of keeping
all the documents of a specific customer on a secure local storage facility with only the hashes of each
document stored on the DLT (in order to facilitate the tracing of past activity while ensuring that banks
still know their customers and can eﬀectively protect customer privacy with regard to cyber attacks).
These points were influential in our decision to assign to the national regulator the role of maintaining
the system.
1.5 The Redefined KYC Process
The IS suggested in this paper to solve the current ineﬃciencies of the KYC process relies on the following
three assumptions: First, a group of financial institutions, working in the same country and therefore
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obliged to respect the same KYC regulations, agrees on the standards for granting core KYC verification
to a customer. Second, all the financial institutions that collaborate in the system agree on the average
costs of conducting a core KYC verification process. This cost might of course depend on the complexity
of each individual customer, based on predetermined parameters (e.g., client size, volume of documents
exchanged, etc.). Third, the national regulator maintains the system and approves financial institutions
to work with the system in order to conduct a more eﬃcient and transparent KYC verification process.
These three assumptions are necessary to ensure a correct incentive structure across the participating
financial institutions.
Further, we define a set of four conditions that must be fulfilled by the artifact. It must ensure the
proportional sharing of the cost of conducting the core KYC verification process; maintain the privacy
standards of the KYC process as they are today; ensure that no institution can claim compensation
without conducting that core process; and ensure that no institution can become a free rider and avoid
paying for using the information generated by other member institutions. The proportionality condition
ensures that the costs are shared proportionally. The irrelevance condition ensures that the financial
institution that conducts the core KYC verification process does not have an incentive to prefer that
another institution conducts the core KYC verification process and vice versa. The privacy condition
ensures that the financial institutions that work in the system cannot know with which other financial
institutions the customer is working, unless the customer reveals that information (privacy is required
among financial institutions). The no-minting condition ensures that no financial institution can simulate
having conducted a core KYC verification process in order to be compensated by other institutions for
work that it has not done. These conditions are summarized in Table 1.
Name Description
Proportionality Ensure that the costs are shared proportionally among all the participating FIs.
Irrelevance Ensure that participating FIs do not have an incentive either to be the first FI
conducting the KYC process or to be one of those that uses the results generated
by the first FI.
Privacy Ensure that one FI cannot infer, from the system, with which other FIs a
customer is working.
No-Minting Ensure that no participating FI has an incentive to simulate having conducted the
KYC process for a customer such that it can claim for compensation to which it is
not entitled.
Table 1: Conditions for ensuring the viability of the system.
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The suggested artifact is composed of two parts. The first part is a permissioned database that stores
the documents that require a certain privacy. The second part is a distributed ledger that serves as
an immutable record and clearing system via which to proportionally distribute the costs of the KYC
process among the participating institutions. The system is held and managed by the regulator, who
enables the database and the DLT infrastructure. This implies that the national regulator develops and
maintains the fabric layer and therefore plays a central role in the system. The clearing itself, however, is
conducted via the smart contract, which comes along with very low clearing costs for this solution. The
artifact works as follows.
1. A number k > 3 of financial institutions and the national regulator agree to interact with the artifact
and set the average price m of conducting a core KYC verification process. The regulator establishes
a digital currency with a fixed exchange rate against the national currency. This automatically assigns
value to the token used in the system. In terms of the abovementioned European Central Bank (2012)
classification, this system would be framed as a Type 3 virtual currency scheme. Each financial institution
can purchase digital currency in exchange for national currency, such that it can later on compensate
other member financial institutions for the verifications that they conduct. The purchased digital cur-
rency can be distributed across as many diﬀerent accounts as each financial institution desires. Since the
system is run by the regulator, no financial institution can know to which financial institutions the other
accounts belong. Only the regulator is aware, with certainty, of the activities of each financial institution.
2. Whenever customers approach a member financial institution to be validated in terms of KYC for the
first time, they are granted a new account (with a public and a private key) through the systems interface.
For the sake of brevity, we refer to the first financial institution that conducts the core KYC verification
for a customer as the “home bank”. Once customers have been granted an account in the system, they
can share with the home bank their public key and the documents that must be analyzed. The exchange
of these documents occurs outside of the distributed ledger to protect the privacy of the customer. The
home bank will keep these documents in its local database. Once the bank decides to validate or reject a
customer, it stores a digitally signed document in the smart contract of this customer and this includes
the result of the core KYC verification process (verified or rejected). Additionally, the hash of each of the
documents submitted by the customer, documents that have been used for the verification, is also stored
by the home bank on the distributed ledger. Once the validation has been conducted, the home bank
creates a “document package” for the customer, which contains the documents submitted by the customer
and that have previously been hashed, as well as the digitally signed document that summarizes the KYC
verification process and includes the result of the core KYC verification. This document package is stored
in the bank’s local database as well as in the permissioned database managed by the regulator. At this
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stage, only the customer and the home bank have the documents package. Further, the home bank
creates a smart contract for this customer, a contract that contains a list of the public keys of the wallets
of the financial institutions that have checked that the status of this customer in terms of KYC has been
verified and that have paid their corresponding fraction of the verification costs. We call this list the
“list of onboarding institutions”. At the time of its creation, when a customer only works with the home
bank, the list of onboarding institutions only contains the public key of the account that the home bank
has used to interact with this customer. This list can later be enlarged as the customer interacts with
further institutions. We suggest that each bank uses a single, unique, one-payment-only account to inter-
act with each customer, since this will later on protect the privacy of financial institutions and customers.
3. Whenever customers approach an institution other than the home bank with the intention of working
with it, they can share with it their public key and key and the address of the original smart contract
in which the home bank wrote the result of the core KYC verification process. Further, they can grant
this institution access in the permissioned database to the documents package previously created by the
home bank, such that it too can read them and validate the customer. Further, by reading the smart
contract, the new financial institution can see how many institutions have worked with the customer so
far, since it can see how many public keys appear in the list of onboarding institutions. To be added to
this list, a financial institution has to pay the proportional part of the average price m of conducting a
core KYC verification process. Specifically, this institution has to pay mk to the smart contract. Note
that k   1 is the number of institutions that have worked with this customer so far (i.e., k   1 is the
number of institutions that are listed in the list of onboarding institutions). The smart contract then
sends the compensation that it has received, divided into equal parts between the k  1 institutions that
had previously worked with this customer, and adds the public key of the account from which it has
received the payment to the list of onboarding institutions. The payment is made in the cryptocurrency
issued by the regulator
4. This mechanism ensures that all the financial institutions that work with one given customer share the
costs of the core KYC verification process proportionally; that is to say, if the k -th institution that starts
working with a customer always contributes with mk and this contribution is distributed in equal parts
among the accounts of the other k   1 institutions, all the institutions that work with the customer end
up paying the same fraction of the average price m of conducting a core KYC verification process. It is
easy to see that for k = 1 only the home bank works with the customer and that it bears the full average
cost m of conducting a core KYC verification process, since no other institution is compensating it for
the work conducted, which is worth m. For the case in which k = 2 , the second financial institution to
join pays m2 to the smart contract, which automatically sends this compensation to the home bank, such
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that both institutions bear a cost equal to m2 . Let us assume now that this system works for a number
k   2, such that the k -th institution pays mk . So far, each of the other k   1 institutions has paid mk 1
and now receives an amount equal to mk(k 1) from the last institution to join. Hence, the cost for each
institution equals mk 1   mk(k 1) = mk .
The smart contract contains the documents’ hash codes, the public key of the home bank, the cer-
tificate of approval, which conveys that the customer has been validated, and an array called “onboarded”
with all the public keys of the financial institutions that have paid the proportional compensation amount
to the home bank. This system ensures that the core KYC process only has to be undertaken once, by
the first institution with which a customer intends to work, but that its result can be used by as many
financial institutions as required by the customer.
This specific setting shows how, for a customer that works with k financial institutions, the exchange of
documents and core KYC verification need only be undertaken once (and not k times as is the case in the
current setting). Furthermore, the total cost of conducting the core KYC verification for one customer
is now the cost m of one single KYC (and not k ⇥m , as in the current practice).
Figure 3: Proposed work flow and cost structure of KYC after the implementation of the artifact.
Figure 3 illustrates the same example case as that presented in Figure 1, but this time following the
introduction of the proposed system. The system enables the same customer to work with the same three
financial institutions, but now the exchange of documents and the core KYC verification process only
occur once and the costs are reduced to a third.
This system fulfills the four previously defined conditions: proportionality, irrelevance, privacy, and no
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minting. With regard to privacy, since each financial institution only uses one account for each customer,
and it is therefore not possible to identify which institution is behind which public key, privacy, for cus-
tomers and financial institutions, is ensured. Only if one customer would work with all the institutions
in the system would all the institutions be able to infer that this was the case. However, since financial
institutions use only one account per customer, their privacy would still be guaranteed with regard to
the rest of the customers. The no-minting condition is fulfilled, since only by paying can an institution
be added to the onboarding institutions list of a customer that approaches it. Since the action of com-
pensating other institutions for the core KYC verification process that has been conducted can only be
triggered by a real customer approaching an institution, no institution has an incentive to fake smart
contracts claiming that it has conducted a core KYC verification process, since in such a case there would
exist no genuine customer behind such a process that would subsequently approach another institution
and ask to be verified.
1.6 Implementing the Redefined KYC Solution
In this section we discuss the implementation considerations of the DLT-based KYC solution previously
described. It is important to note that the implementation of such a system would have significant
implications for the financial sector and that it would therefore need to be carried out in close coordination
with the regulator. Further, many of the dimensions of the system would depend on specific national
guidelines and legislation. Hence, in this section we discuss both the suggested system and two variations
on it that oﬀer diﬀerent degrees of centralization and thus make possible its implementation. We also
discuss alternative designs and look into the challenges and benefits of those designs.
1.6.1 Design of a KYC Solution
The system proposed in Figure 4 explains the new KYC process using the example of a customer that
approaches two financial institutions. In a first step, the customer approaches the home bank and pro-
vides the required KYC documents for verification. The home bank uses the system’s application (which
is installed at each of the participating documents onbanks) to handle the process of document exchange
with the customer outside of the distributed ledger and to store these documents in its local database.
When any document is processed by the home bank, the hash of the document is stored on the distributed
ledger. Once the home bank has validated the customer, it can create the abovementioned document
package, which contains all the documents that have been used (and previously hashed) to grant the
verification status, as well as the digitally signed document that grants verification to this customer.
Later on, the customer can provide access to this document package to any other institution with which
it intends to work. Hence, the next institution that needs to validate this customer in terms of KYC can
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use the local client application and communicate with the smart contract of the customer in order to
obtain the customer’s status, inscribe itself in the list of onboarding institutions, and handle the neces-
sary payment over the blockchain as described in the previous section. Further, since this institution has
been granted access to the document package by the customer, it can store a copy of it on its own database.
Figure 4: Design of the KYC solution.
In the proposed solution, the regulator is assigned a central role as a trusted third party (TTP) and
owner of the “fabric layer”. This could represent a possible shortcoming of the system if – for example
– the regulator were corrupt, or compromised by hacking or by insider fraud. This is indeed an aspect
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that can be further analyzed in the future. In order to mitigate this potential shortcoming to a certain
extent, the TTP characteristics described by Lee et al. (2016) could be incorporated.
1.6.2 Decentralized KYC Solution
The solution proposed in the previous subsection can be further decentralized with the following mod-
ifications. First, if the DLT part of the solution were implemented directly on the Ethereum network
rather than using a private blockchain, any attempt to change the information on the blockchain would be
made more diﬃcult due to the existence of a large mining community that is harder to corrupt. Second,
the regulator could be removed from the system, thus precluding the risk of there being a party that
has an unlimited view of the system. Last, some further eﬃciency could be introduced by storing the
data only at the financial institution that has actually approved the customer. This solution is shown in
Fig. 5. While we acknowledge these benefits, our discussions with experts indicate that in most Western
countries the risk of a corrupt regulator is considered low when weighed against the benefit of the higher
financial stability that would result from the regulator’s ability to easily and routinely check the KYC
process. Furthermore, storing the documents locally ensures that any bank that works with a client
would check of the KYC documents whenever it wished. In our proposed design we have used a private
distributed ledger and not a public one. This decision was based on the feedback received from the
finance executives consulted during the DSR process, who stated that banks would not be comfortable
having customers’ private information available on a public distributed ledger (even if only hash code
values of documents and the key to decrypt the customer document package were to be kept on a public
ledger). This is understandable, as potential bugs in the smart contract or reverse engineering of the
smart contract bytecode could lead to the risk of exposing information unintentionally. Luu et al. (2016)
scan 19,366 smart contracts on Ethereum and find vulnerabilities in 8833 of them. The stated concerns
of the finance executives consulted are, then, well grounded. Further, the whole compensation scheme
that enables the cost reduction and cost sharing within the system is only possible thanks to the use of
DLT.
A more mature DLT would allow for a ledger in which stored documents can be held completely privately.
This would make possible a decentralized, permissioned database held on a blockchain. In such a sys-
tem, the document package would only be stored on a distributed ledger, and not on a central database
managed by the regulator. The projects R3 Corda and Hyperledger are moving in this direction. While
these projects are not mature enough currently, they may well be in the near future.
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Figure 5: Design of the distributed KYC system. The blockchain is public, the documents are only
kept by the home bank and the regulator does not have privileged access.
1.6.3 Centralized KYC Solution
It is possible to benefit from cost sharing during the KYC process by using a diﬀerent, fully centralized
KYC artifact. This would require only one party being allowed to approve or reject customers. One
such centralized solution would be to transfer the entire KYC responsibility to one specialized entity or a
regulator-operated KYC oﬃce. In such a design, the customer would need to be authorized by the entity
and, subsequently, each bank that wanted to work with that customer would obtain a permission to do so
from the centralized authority. This solution is shown in Figure 6, and while it is unlikely to be adopted
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as it creates an additional cost for the regulator and in essence frees banks from the responsibility of
knowing their customers, there are some significant benefits to be gained from such a solution. The main
benefit is that by removing the costs of KYC from banks (and other financial institutions) we reduce
significantly the cost of forming a new financial entity and, in this way, open the market up to increased
competition. Furthermore, this reduction in costs for banks would lead to lower fees for customers and
lower costs for doing business in a given country. That in turn would benefit a country that uses a
centralized KYC solution as that country would be perceived as being open for business and competitive
without necessarily compromising AML or KYC requirements.
Figure 6: Design of the centralized KYC system.
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1.6.4 The Use of Distributed Ledger Technology
Having presented a solution, it is worth considering why the use of DLT represents an improvement
compared to other possible technologies. First, there would be improvements in terms of auditing and
tracking. This is advantageous for the national regulator since it provides a clear record of the information
that financial institutions verify prior to the opening of accounts, and could serve as a single point of truth
should disagreement occur. And the immutable nature of the record created by DLT-based solutions
cannot be matched by other technologies. Second, the proposed system allows collaboration between
financial institutions that do not necessary trust one another. Specifically, given that financial institutions
compete for customers’ assets and accounts, only a system that allows for anonymous collaboration –
such as anonymous compensation and anonymous document sharing – would gain the support of financial
institutions. Third, one of the major contributions of the solution proposed here is that an institution
can be anonymously and proportionately compensated by others for the eﬀorts conducted to verify a
customer. This is only possible due to the features of the distributed ledger, which allow institutions to
communicate with one another without revealing their identities but ensure that each institution abides
by all relevant regulations at all times. Fourth, it is important to note that the system proposed here
– irrespective of the technology used to enable it – is, in essence, a system for interbank collaboration.
Since financial institutions are studying broader interbank collaborations based on DLT – such as the
R3 project – it seems logical to propose a system such as the one presented here, which already takes
core DLT features into account, such that it can, in the future, be integrated into a broader DLT-based
framework. Last, and taking into account that such a novel system would in any case need a clearing
instance to settle the compensations, DLT eliminates high central authority fees. All in all, the solution
proposed here from DLT for the following reasons: the application of this technology allows for the
automation of a process, increases the information available if a dispute should occur, reduces settlement
time compared to other technologies, and reduces business costs.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper has suggested an IS to reduce the aggregated cost of KYC in a jurisdiction by means of DLT.
The main eﬃciency gain that this IS proposes is the avoidance of the same tasks being duplicated by
diﬀerent financial institutions. Additionally, this paper has shown how it is possible to distribute the
costs of the core KYC verification process proportionally among those financial institutions, solutions
that require the verification process be carried out for one given customer, and has defined a series of
conditions that the IS in question needs to fulfill in order to ensure the correct incentive structure for
the participating institutions. The maximum total cost saving per customer generated by the proposed
IS can be measured as
P
imi ⇥ (ki   1), where mi, is the cost of conducting a full core KYC verification
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for a customer i, and ki, is the number of financial institutions that conduct business with customer i.
This implies that the monetary savings brought about by the proposed IS and the increased eﬃciency
that it would deliver for both customers and institutions are significantly aﬀected by the number of fi-
nancial institutions that participate in the system. The proposed IS has emerged from the application of
design science research to the problems of high costs for financial institutions and the low satisfaction of
customers when conducting a core KYC verification process. The fact that the smart contracts in which
the information is stored would be owned by the customers and not by the participating institutions
already addresses the paradigm shift taking place with regard to consumer data in light of the General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which will come into force in 2018 (European Commission 2016).
For example, a simple extension of the system could oblige the client application running at each bank to
regularly check in order to detect if a customer has decided to no longer work with the bank and ensure
that customer’s private documents are deleted. Performing a core KYC verification process on a dis-
tributed ledger has many intersections with ongoing research in the area of digital identity in distributed
ledgers. One question that arises here is that of the location in which customers’ sensitive documents
would be stored. In the proposed IS, all the information is stored locally by each bank, as well as in a
permissioned database maintained by the regulator. This is primarily due to the high cost of storage on
the Ethereum platform on which the artifact was first designed. It is possible to conduct other designs
based on permissioned, contractually based solutions such as R3CEV’s Corda or Monetas, both of which
are currently generating a lot of interest. Corda and the Ethereum blockchain have similarities, but the
former is – in its essence – the combination of a distributed database and a Java Virtual Machine, en-
abling parties on the network to execute bilateral transactions involving sensitive information that is not
revealed to the public. These kinds of solutions could oﬀer new approaches to providing distributed but
private document exchange between customers and financial institutions that include storage possibilities
for larger documents. However, solutions such as Corda are still in their early stages of development and
privacy with regard to the customer data that is shared in such a system is a concern that needs to be
thoroughly addressed.
Regardless of the chosen approach to using DLT, be it a distributed database or a private, restricted, or
public blockchain, our research suggests many opportunities to increase eﬃciency in the financial system.
More specifically, a significant reduction in costs for the participating institutions and an improved expe-
rience for customers could both be delivered by such a system. Furthermore, the system would – thanks
to the decreased regulatory costs of KYC – lower the barriers to operating a financial institution, thus
opening the financial market up to further competition.
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Abstract
Systems that use blockchain technology to improve the know-your-customer (KYC) process have
only been proposed at a conceptual level and all share certain attributes that make their adoption
by financial institutions (FIs) very diﬃcult. We propose and program a blockchain-based system that
reduces and shares out among the financial institutions that work with a customer the costs of the KYC
process and also makes it possible for FIs to dynamically update information related to customers and
disseminates this information among participating FIs. Additionally, and by means of a distributed
database architecture, our system addresses some of the attributes that hinder the adoption of previously
proposed solutions by FIs. The result is a programmed, stand-alone solution that can be implemented by
FIs to reduce the cost of the KYC process without requiring any central instance to store the customer’s
data, and in which FIs share the initial costs of the KYC process as well as the running costs of keeping
the information about customers up to date. Our system increases the levels of security and regulatory
compliance in the KYC process and significantly reduces the cost of that process for all parties involved.
Keywords: Blockchain, Information Systems, KYC, DLT, Distributed Databases
Note : A version of this paper has been published as Parra-Moyano, J., Thoroddsen, T., and Ross, O.,
Optimised and Dynamic KYC System Based on Blockchain Technology, Int. J. Blockchains and
Cryptocurrencies, 1 (1), 85-106, 2019.
2.1 Introduction
The know-your-customer (KYC) process that financial institutions (FIs) are obliged to follow whenever
they establish a financial relationship with a new customer represents a significant financial burden for
FIs but creates no productive added value. The KYC process is made up of a series of routine tasks that,
when carried out, are meant to verify the lawfulness of a potential customer’s activities. Every FI needs
to follow the KYC process before even starting to work with a new customer. The cost of KYC is rising.
Thompson Reuters (2017) estimates that on average large financial institutions with turnovers in excess
of USD 10 billion increased their annual spending related to KYC obligations from USD 142 million to
USD 150 million during 2016. The same report contains the prediction that spending on KYC-related
tasks would increase by 11 percent over the 12 months following its publication. According to Thompson
Reuters (2017), corporate customers work on average with 11 FIs, which implies that this—costly—KYC
process is repeated on average eleven times for each corporate customer. The average time an FI takes
to “onboard” a corporate customer is 26 working days.
The increasingly widespread use of blockchain technology has led to the development of new systems
that are meant to improve the eﬃciency of the KYC process and to enable cooperation among FIs. If
achieved, both these goals will lower the costs of KYC. Parra-Moyano and Ross (2017) were the first
to suggest that the KYC process should be conducted only by the first FI that wishes to work with a
given customer, and that the result of conducting the process (proof of the lawfulness of that customer’s
activities and of the customer’s “validation”) should be shared in an anonymized and secure form with
all FIs that subsequently wish to establish a financial relationship with that customer. The system
proposed by Parra-Moyano and Ross (2017) also includes a structure that distributes, proportionately,
those KYC costs initially borne by the first FI in order to work with a given customer among all the FIs
that subsequently work with that customer, including that first FI. While their proposals constitute an
innovative approach to reducing the costs of KYC, they involve certain inherent ineﬃciencies that make
their implementation in a corporate environment diﬃcult. These include the need for a trusted third
party (TTP) to store the customers’ data and carry out the financial compensations between FIs and
that no updates or changes in the information status of a customer are possible. Parra-Moyano and Ross
(2017) also only develop their proposed system on the conceptual level.
Our aims with the present paper are to review the work carried out by Parra-Moyano and Ross (2017) as
well as a range of the other blockchain-based systems thus far proposed as ways of improving the KYC
process and to tackle the open issues that make the implementation of these systems in the corporate
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environment diﬃcult. This enables us to suggest a system that can be realistically implemented in the
financial sector and to develop a stand-alone proof of concept (PoC) of the system that can be used as a
foundation from which corporations and regulators will be able to explore and—eventually—conduct the
implementation of blockchain-based KYC solutions. In Section 2.2 we briefly describe the current KYC
process and the requirements it must fulfill. In Section 2.3 we provide a brief introduction to blockchain
technology and innovations in the architecture of distributed databases, focusing on the attributes of
these two technologies that make the system that we propose possible. In Section 2.4 we analyze those
systems that claim to improve—by using blockchain technology—KYC as it currently stands. In Section
2.5 we describe how we used design science research (DSR) to refine these previously proposed systems
and to derive our PoC. In Section 2.6 we describe, from a non-technical perspective, the refined system
that we propose, and we present the code that yields the PoC. In Section 2.7 we conclude.
2.2 Current KYC System
In recent years, the KYC due diligence process has evolved from a simple formality into a thorough pro-
cess supervised by national institutions. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF)—an intergovernmental
body established to combat money laundering and the funding of terrorism—sets the international stan-
dard for KYC. That standard is outlined in the FATF Recommendations (The Financial Action Task
Force, 2012-2017), a document that was first published in 2012 and was updated in November 2017.
We can paraphrase the FATF Recommendations’ minimum requirements for FIs conducting the KYC
process as follows:
1) Identify the customer and verify that customer’s identity using reliable, independent source docu-
ments, data, or information.
2) Identify the “beneficial owner”, verify the beneficial owner’s identity, and understand the ownership
and control structure of the customer.
3) Understand and obtain information on the purpose and intended nature of the business relation-
ship.
4) Conduct ongoing due diligence on the business relationship throughout the course of the relationship
to ensure that the transactions being conducted are consistent with the FI’s knowledge of the customer.
The first three of these requirements must be met by each FI before it establishes a financial rela-
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tionship with a new customer. Thus, if one customer works (or intends to work) simultaneously with n
FIs, the KYC process for that customer will be repeated n times. Although each FI is responsible for its
own KYC process and must conduct due diligence independently of other FIs, a core portion of KYC due
diligence—namely, points 1, 2, and 4 in the above list, is a routine process that is carried out in parallel
by all FIs that work (or intend to work) with the same customer. Thus, costly tasks are carried out
repeatedly and in parallel whenever a customer works with two or more FIs. Figure 7, which we derive
from Parra-Moyano and Ross 2018, schematically describes the current scenario.
Figure 7: Current KYC Scenario, (adapted from Parra-Moyano and Ross, 2017).
2.3 Blockchain and Distributed Database Technology
This section briefly introduces the two technologies that we use as basis for the solution that we propose in
Section 2.5—namely, blockchain technology, which was introduced by Nakamoto (2008), and the private
distribution of data across distributed databases, introduced by Siegenthaler and Birman (2009a and
2009b).
2.3.1 Blockchain Technology
Blockchain technology oﬀers a global, distributed transactional database in which nodes are linked to
one another by a peer-to-peer (P2P) communication network with an own layer of protocol messages
for node communication. Users of a blockchain can reference one another using their respective public
keys and can use their private keys to cryptographically sign messages and transactions (Glaser, 2017).
Although blockchain technology has gained notoriety primarily due to the advent of crypto-currencies,
such as Bitcoin, which was introduced by Nakamoto (2008), researchers and practitioners are applying it
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in a number of ways to improve existing information systems (IS) and make them more eﬃcient.
One of the ways in which blockchain technology contributes to the improvement of IS is that it makes
the execution of “smart contracts” by any node that has access to the blockchain possible. Smart con-
tracts are computer protocols that facilitate, verify, or enforce predefined clauses whenever a given set of
conditions is met (Parra-Moyano and Ross, 2017). Once a smart contract is triggered, it can carry out
automatized, predefined actions. Currently, the three largest distributed ledger platforms that facilitate
smart contracts are Ethereum, from the Ethereum Foundation; Hyperledger, from IBM; and Corda from
R3. Because, in a blockchain, a copy of the ledger is distributed to each node, there is no need for a TTP
to act as a notary with regard to processes that involve participating nodes that do not trust one another.
The validity of the information stored on a blockchain’s ledgers is ensured by the network’s nodes with
the help of a secure hash algorithm (SHA). Blockchain technology uses an SHA to translate the contents
of a block into a cryptographic fingerprint referred to as a “hash”. An SHA can also be used to generate
from a digital document a unique “fingerprint” of that document, such that this fingerprint cannot be
replicated unless it is generated from the exact same document. This ensures that all of a blockchain’s
participants can easily verify the authenticity of any document previously hashed simply by hashing it
again and comparing the hash they generate to the hash that was previously generated using the authentic
document. Further, the hash does not reveal any information about the contents of a document, just as
analyzing a human fingerprint can help one to prove the identity of an individual but fails to reveal—for
example—the features of that individual’s face. In a distributed ledger with multiple nodes, the infor-
mation recorded by the network is stored sequentially in a list of records that is divided into blocks and
distributed to all nodes on the network. The information in each individual block is then used by the
system’s protocol to generate a secure hash that identifies that specific block. Each subsequent block
records the hash of the previous block such that all blocks are chained together sequentially making it
impossible to change information in one block without changing all previous blocks. If one node alters the
information on its ledger and tries to interact with the network using what is, thus, “false” information, the
hash will no longer match the ledger distributed to the other nodes on the network and the transactions
that this node attempts to conduct will not be accepted by these other nodes. The process of verify-
ing transactions and ensuring that blocks have not been altered is carried out by the nodes of the network.
Blockchains are, most commonly, either “public” or “permissioned”. A permissioned blockchain limits
the number of nodes that can access it or that can approve the hashes that are to be saved on the ledger.
A public blockchain, meanwhile, has an unlimited number of nodes and is accessible to all.
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In order for it to be maintained, a blockchain requires a protocol that defines the roles and rules that
apply on it. The many protocols that can be implemented in blockchain technology include proof of work
(PoW), proof of stake (PoS), and proof of authority (PoA). PoW incentivizes the participating nodes to
spend computational power (work) and write new blocks. The fact that spending computational power
is costly means that rewriting the blockchain is expensive; this secures the blockchain against fraudulent
attacks, which indeed need to rewrite the blockchain in order to be successful. To compensate “miners”
(nodes that verify transactions in all kinds of mineable blockchains), the protocol provides a reward in the
form of crypto-currency to the first miner that writes a valid block. The PoS protocol relies on a smart
contract that holds deposits—of a crypto-currency—made by nodes that wish to act as miners. The node
that supplies the largest amount of crypto-currency is assigned the authority to mine by the blockchain’s
owner. Once a node has been granted this authority it no longer needs to rely on computational power to
be allowed to mine. The PoA protocol defines that pre-authorized nodes act as miners and add blocks to
the blockchain. Instead of using hash power to write valid blocks—as is the case with PoW—or providing
funds in order to be granted the right to mine, PoA nodes are able to add blocks to the blockchain at
any time.
2.3.2 Private Information Sharing Across Distributed Databases
Siegenthaler and Birman (2009a and 2009b) introduce a database architecture that allows the electronic
sharing of privacy-sensitive data across distinct nodes and respects very high privacy standards. This
architecture was constructed to allow hospitals—holders of patients’ medical data—to share patient data
with each other to improve patients’ treatment and respects three privacy principles that ensure that
only the necessary information about patients is shared and that hospitals making and receiving queries
do not learn anything about one another that can reveal information about the patients that is sensitive
or is irrelevant to a patient’s treatment. Specifically, the database architecture that they introduce allows
entities to store diﬀerent pieces of data such that the following three principles are respected:
1) Data privacy. Queriers learn only the answer to their query, not any of the data used to compute that
answer.
2) Query privacy. The data owner does not learn the particulars of the query, only that a query was
performed against a particular patient’s information.
3) Anonymous communication. Neither queriers nor data owners know who the opposite party is. For
this architecture to work, the database schemas of the hospitals are irrelevant; it is suﬃcient for the data
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producers to provide a read-only API to the members of the network. This system allows data to be
shared between nodes in a secure and encrypted manner.This system does, however, require a TTP to
manage both access and the right to perform queries against other nodes’ databases.
For this architecture to work, the databases’ schema of the hospitals is irrelevant; it is suﬃcient for
the data producers to provide a read-only API to the members of the network. This system allows the
data sharing between nodes in a secure and encrypted manner. This system does, however, require a
TTP to manage both access and the right to perform queries against other nodes’ databases.
2.4 Previously Proposed KYC Systems Based on Blockchain Technology
Since the KYC process—whether observed from a national or an international perspective—is charac-
terized by many duplicated tasks carried out by agents that do not trust one another, it seems that
blockchain technology may have significant promise when it comes to reducing ineﬃciencies and costs
and to oﬀering a more eﬃcient structure under which to conduct KYC. It comes as little surprise then
that a number of bodies and organizations have suggested various approaches to using distributed ledger
technology (DLT) to improve KYC systems.
Parra-Moyano and Ross (2017) propose a blockchain-based system that improves the eﬃciency and re-
duces the cost of the KYC customer-onboarding process. Their system is meant to be run by a national
regulator, which provides and maintains the system’s physical and operational structure. In this system,
the KYC process is carried out only once, by the first FI that is approached by a customer. When that
customer approaches another FI with the aim of establishing a financial relationship, this second FI can
see—by consulting the blockchain—that the KYC process has already been carried out (in this case by
the first FI) and can thus focus solely on certain, limited aspects of KYC (namely, understanding the
customer’s activities) and does not need to perform routine, mechanical document verification. Further,
the system includes a mechanism that distributes the costs of conducting the KYC process proportion-
ally among all participating FIs that work with a given customer. While this is the most comprehensive
work on blockchain-based KYC systems that the literature currently contains, it possesses a series of
characteristics that hinder its implementation in the corporate environment and therefore needs to be
improved upon if it is to become truly useful for FIs and regulators. The first aspect that needs to be
improved is the fact that in Parra-Moyano and Ross’ (2017) solution the TTP must periodically check
that the FIs in the system have paid the proportion of the cost that they are meant to have paid and have
not simply used the system to verify that the documents presented to them by any given customer have
previously been validated. The second aspect that requires improvement is the fact that in the system
36
proposed by Parra-Moyano and Ross (2017) the status of a customer cannot be updated by an FI in a
decentralized way; rather, the KYC onboarding process is only conducted once for each customer and
by one FI only, and the system does not envisage the potential need for periodic updates with regard
to a customer. Thus, if a customer is validated by the first FI but its status later needs to be changed
due to—for example—irregularities in its activities, information with regard to the customer’s new status
cannot be disseminated using the system to all those FIs that work with that customer. A third aspect
that is susceptible to improvement is that the proposed system is unable to make dynamic compensations
between participating FIs. Such a dynamic compensation system is required in order to allow for financial
compensations among the FIs participating in the system over time, specifically whenever an FI needs to
update a customer’s KYC status or history. A fourth aspect that could be improved concerns the storage
of customers’ documents. Parra-Moyano and Ross (2017) propose a complex database architecture in
which customers need to store these data privately and circulate them among the FIs with which they
want to work. Such a structure is costly, and it becomes clear—when one compares the customer journey
that emerges from this structure with the existing customer journey—that the self-storage aspect would
be a disadvantage.
The R3 Project, run by a consortium of banks, conducts applied research on blockchain applications.
R3 runs Corda, an open-source distributed ledger platform designed to record, manage, and automate
legal agreements between businesses. The Corda network is made up of nodes, where each node represents
a run-time environment hosting Corda services and executing applications, or “CorDapps”. CorDapps are
participant applications that execute contract code and communicate using a flow framework to achieve
consensus over some given business activity. While there already exist CorDapps for asset trading (IRS
Demo and Trader Demo), as well as for portfolio valuation (see SIMM and Portfolio Demo—also known
as the Initial Margin Agreement Demo), there does not yet exist a functioning CorDapp for KYC/AML.
Rutter (2018) describes the benefits of decentralizing the KYC process and provides a conceptual descrip-
tion and comparison of two diﬀerent decentralized scenarios run on Corda—namely, the “Self-Sovereign
Model” and the “Bank Sharing Model”. In the self-sovereign model corporate customers create and manage
their own identities and relevant documentation, granting permission to multiple participants to access
this data whenever they require it. In such a system, the relationship remains one of customer to bank,
with the rights and responsibilities of each laid out in a contract and the bank not necessarily storing
any of the customer’s data. Instead, the customer permits the release of their data to each individual bank.
The use of blockchain technology in the development of digital identity has also proved promising.
Blockchain technology can be used to register and store the credentials and ID-related information of
users and can act as a TTP, verifying users’ identities (Shocard, 2017; and Civic, 2017). These types of
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digital identity blockchain solutions may have important implications for the improvement of the KYC
process.
Britton (2016) briefly analyzes the potential uses of blockchain technology in the context of KYC/anti-
money laundering (AML) measures. While he considers that the KYC framework is probably one of the
most suitable for the application of blockchain technology, he also addresses the diﬃculties of realistically
establishing such a system. Specifically, he states that while there is immense potential in the application
of blockchain technology for KYC, there are certain challenges that need to be addressed if one is to
create a viable proposition that can be adopted by the industry. He pays special attention to the network
eﬀect that must be present in a valid blockchain-based KYC solution and claims that it could only result
from collaboration among market participants working toward a mutually beneficial solution that would
enable them all to focus on the customer.
The Hong Kong Monetary Authority (2016) has studied the potential benefits of blockchain technol-
ogy for the financial sector. The authors of the study conclude that the technology oﬀers the potential
for banks to share identity information in an eﬀective and secure manner, such that digitized customer
records and documents could be shared among banks using a blockchain-based platform. The Authority
specifically states that such an arrangement would oﬀer a number of benefits. First, customers would no
longer need to repeat the same processes and submit the same personal information to diﬀerent banks for
KYC purposes; second, the costs incurred due to and the resources needed for the identity-verification
process would both decrease because the information in question would be readily accessible and shared
via the blockchain; third, the checking of customers’ history could be carried out eﬃciently by partici-
pating banks because customers’ information would be available in the blockchain; and fourth, a better
customer experience would result. The authors of the study also state that existing KYC requirements
and customer-authentication processes are manually intensive and require significant resources from FIs
that seek to be compliant. The authors do not, however, propose a specific design for such a system.
2.5 Research Methodology: Design Science Research
The aim of design science research is to extend the boundaries of human and organizational capabilities
by creating new and innovative artifacts (Hevner, 2004). Since in this paper we aim to propose an op-
timized, blockchain-technology-based KYC artifact that enhances the capabilities of FIs, design science
research is an appropriate method for our purpose. Well-founded design science research, according to
Hevner (2004), follows seven guidelines and results in a technology-based solution that solves a relevant
business problem. These guidelines are depicted in Table 2.
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Guideline Description
Design as Artifact Design science research must produce a viable artifact in the form of a
construct, a model, a method, or an instantiation.
Problem Relevance The objective of design science research is to develop technology-based
solutions to important and relevant business problems.
Design Evaluation The utility, quality, and eﬃcacy of a design artifact must be rigorously
demonstrated via well-executed evaluation methods.
Research Contributions Eﬀective design science research must provide clear and verifiable
contributions in the areas of the design artifact, design foundations,
and/or design methodologies.
Research Rigor Design science research relies upon the application of rigorous methods
in both the construction and the evaluation of the design artifact.
Design as a Search Process The search for an eﬀective artifact requires using available means to
reach desired ends while satisfying laws in the problem environment.
Communication of Research Design science research must be presented eﬀectively both to
technology-oriented and to management-oriented audiences.
Table 2: Guidelies for DSR (adapted from Hevner, 2004).
We rigorously follow these seven guidelines in order to propose an optimized KYC system. Because
in this paper we propose a viable, technology-based artifact in the form of an instantiation that solves
the problem of the high cost of KYC we follow guidelines one and two. We demonstrate the utility,
quality, and eﬃcacy of the artifact by following a well-executed process—that proposed by Peﬀers, Tuu-
nanen, Rothenberger, and Chatterjee (2007), which is similar to the procedure followed by Parra-Moyano
and Ross (2017)— and thus follow guideline three. Specifically, the process is divided into five steps,
as illustrated in Figure 8: identifying the problem, defining the objectives, designing and refining the
artifact, demonstrating the artifact, and evaluating the artifact. We recursively repeated the last three
steps of the process to carry out a vigorous evaluation of the artifact’s design.
Figure 8: DSR Process (adapted from Pfeﬀers et al., 2007).
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In following guideline four, we provide not only a blockchain-technology-based KYC solution that solves
the open issues of all the previously published blockchain-technology-based KYC solutions, but also a
programmed, functioning artifact that can serve as the foundation upon which other researchers and
practitioners may develop the artifact further. Programing such an artifact has never been done before.
To ensure our adherence to guidelines five and six we collaborated for seven months with blockchain and
KYC experts from Origo, Iceland’s leading systems integrator and managed service provider. Origo’s
experts not only systematically evaluated the progress made by our research, they also contributed—
with valuable insights—to the design and the coding of the artifact. We communicate our results in a
manner that is in line with prevailing academic style and language, but one that also renders the proposed
solution accessible to practitioners, as is dictated by guideline seven.
Previous research has identified the problem of the increase in KYC costs for FIs, as we have explained
in the previous section. But while researching those systems that have been proposed explicitly to im-
prove the KYC process by applying blockchain technology we failed to identify even one single academic
publication that addressed both the theoretical conception of a blockchain-based KYC solution and its
technical development in the form of a PoC. Further, during our research we identified a series of ineﬃ-
ciencies in the previously proposed conceptual solutions. We embodied all these problems in the definition
of the following research question:
“Can we conceptually develop a blockchain-based solution that improves the KYC process for financial
institutions and that solves the open issues of previously suggested systems, while programming it and
converting it into a functioning, verifiable, replicable instantiation? ”
With the problem(s) identified and our objective—embodied in our research question— defined, we
recursively undertook the three remaining steps of the process proposed by Peﬀers et al. (2007). The
first sequence of this design and refine, demonstrate, and evaluate phase was carried out in collaboration
with the experts from Origo, who assessed the conceptual solution and the artifact’s smart contracts, con-
structively criticizing those characteristics of the solution that would hinder the system’s implementation
in a corporate environment. Their contributions proved essential. Thanks to their corporate experience
we were able to identify elements of the initial solution that required improvement if the solution was to
be implementable. We refined the solution in further loops. The focus of one of these refinement loops
was the dynamic compensation system that we propose here. To our knowledge, all previous blockchain-
based KYC solutions propose only static compensation between participating FIs, neglecting the fact
that update costs might be incurred over time due to the demands of continued compliance with KYC
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regulations. Therefore, in the aforementioned loop we focused solely on establishing a smart contract that
could accommodate dynamic compensation among participating FIs, and developed a solution that both
allows for dynamic payments and respects proportionality in the payments made among FIs. We con-
ducted another refinement loop focusing on the role of the TTP, a role that is central to all the solutions
published thus far. We concentrated on reducing the reliance of the system on controls conducted by the
TTP, ensuring instead intrinsic incentives for participating FIs. Our aim in suggesting this improvement
is to increase the autonomy of the system by transforming the artificial incentives present in previously
proposed systems into intrinsic incentives and to ease the implementation of the system by means of
distributed a database architecture like the one proposed by Siegenthaler and Birman (2009a and 2009b),
which is used in the healthcare sector to securely share patients’ private information among hospitals.
Combining blockchain technology and the distributed database architecture suggested by Siegenthaler
and Birman (2009a and 2009b), in general and in this particular manner, has already been suggested by
Parra-Moyano and Schmedders (2018).
2.6 Optimized, Dynamic KYC System
In this section we describe the process and logic of the optimized, dynamic system we propose for
reducing the cost and proportional cost share of KYC. We start with a description of the assumptions
and conditions that must be fulfilled by the system and continue with a non-technical description of the
system. We conclude with a description of the proposed system’s technical aspects.
2.6.1 Assumptions and Conditions
The solution that we propose in this section combines elements of the proposals that we describe in
Sections 2.3 and 2.4, but specifically takes as its basis the system suggested by Parra-Moyano and Ross
(2017) and combines it with the distributed database architecture suggested by Siegenthaler and Birman
(2009a and 2009b). The four key assumptions of Parra-Moyano and Ross (2017) are:
1) All FIs with access to the system respect and work in the same regulatory framework.
2) All customers can be categorized by the eﬀort required of an FI to conduct the KYC process for
them.
3) All FIs with access to the system agree on an average cost of conducting the KYC process per category
of customer.
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4) A TTP, such as a regulator, maintains the system and approves the FIs that have access to the system.
Assumptions one and four are required in order to achieve the goal of proportional cost sharing among
participating FIs working in the same regulatory framework. In the present paper we specify assumptions
two and three in greater detail such that a system that fulfills these assumptions is able to compute not
only the average cost—per category of customer—of conducting the KYC process once, but also the
cost of updating, where necessary, the KYC-related information of any existing customer. Specifically,
we suggest using measurable parameters that are derived from the time spent on conducting the KYC
process (e.g., the size of a corporation, number of documents required, and number of beneficiaries) and
that can be used to dynamically determine both these sets of costs. We state the revised assumptions
two and three as follows:
2’) All customers can be categorized by the eﬀort spent on the KYC process, and by the eﬀort re-
quired to update their KYC status.
3’) All FIs with access to the system agree on the cost of conducting the KYC process per category
of customer, and on the cost of updating the KYC status of a customer.
The greater detail contained in these two revised conditions implies a significant improvement on the
system proposed by Parra-Moyano and Ross (2017) since it enables us to replicate, in a closer manner
than proposed by Parra-Moyano and Ross (2017), the current nature and requirements of the FATF
Recommendations (2017). More specifically, the fact that we allow for the dynamic but transparent
measurement of KYC costs and— more importantly—for the dynamic correction and updating of the
KYC status of any existing customer enables us to propose a less rigid system than that put forward by
Parra-Moyano and Ross (2017).
Parra-Moyano and Ross (2017), further, define four conditions that the system must fulfill in order
to ensure a correct incentive structure. These conditions are:
Proportionality: Ensure that the costs are shared proportionally among all the participating FIs.
Irrelevance: Ensure that participating FIs do not have an incentive either to be the first FI conducting
the KYC process or to be one of those that use the results generated by the first FI.
42
Privacy: Ensure that one FI cannot infer, from the system, with which other FIs a customer is working.
No-minting: Ensure that no participating FI has an incentive to simulate having conducted the KYC
process for a customer such that it can claim for compensation to which it is not entitled.
These assumptions and conditions constitute the yardstick against which we measure the applicability of
the system that we propose in the following subsections.
2.6.2 Non-Technical Description of the Optimized, Dynamic KYC Process
A consortium of FIs can use their existing database architecture to construct a system like the one pro-
posed by Siegenthaler and Birman (2009a and 2009b). In order to grant read and write permission to FIs
other than the one that conducted the KYC process, we use a private, PoA-based blockchain in which
only FIs belonging to the consortium can participate. These two pieces of technology (the distributed
database architecture to share sensitive data and the blockchain technology to manage permissions) con-
stitute the main innovation of our system.
Whenever a customer has yet to be registered on the network, the first FI to onboard that customer
using the network (hereafter referred to as the “Home Bank”) must proceed in the following manner:
1) The Home Bank gathers all necessary documents, verifies the customer’s identity, and generates a
digitally signed document indicating the outcome of the core KYC process—this outcome can be either
“approved” or “rejected”.
2) The Home Bank stores all the documents used in the KYC process as a “document package” in
its own encrypted database.
3) The Home Bank creates a smart contract for the customer and on it stores the hash of the docu-
ment package, the network address of the customer, and the monetary value m that corresponds to the
cost of conducting the KYC process for this customer (the last of these according to the predefined cate-
gory to which this customer belongs in terms of the eﬀort required to conduct the KYC process). When
the smart contract is deployed by the Home Bank, its ownership passes from the Bank to the customer.
The smart contract records the address of the Home Bank in a list referred to as the list of onboarding
institutions. At this point, the only FI on that list is the Home Bank. When the customer seeks to work
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with a second FI, this second FI—“Bank B” for brevity—must proceed in the following manner:
1) Bank B activates the smart contract of the customer and thus learns the proportion of the already
incurred cost that it has to pay to the smart contract in order to get permission to read the documents
related to the customer stored in the Home Bank’s database. Since Bank B is the second FI that intends
to work with the customer, it should pay the existing cost m divided by two.
2) Since the customer is willing to work with Bank B, she will grant permission to Bank B to pay
the fraction m2 to the smart contract such that once Bank B conducts the payment it automatically gets
the right to read this customer’s document package as stored in the Home Bank’s database.
3) Bank B can now make an API call to the database of the Home Bank and read the documents
regarding this particular customer using an architecture like the one proposed by Siegenthaler and Bir-
man (2009a and 2009b).
Figure 9: Schematic Representation of our System.
One of the diﬃculties in applying the system put forward by Parra-Moyano and Ross (2017) is caused
by the fact that everything written on a distributed ledger is visible to all those who participate in the
network. This visibility introduces a vulnerability to the system’s incentive structure because the hashes
stored on the ledger can be obtained by a user with enough technical knowledge, and that user is then
able to see the KYC status of a customer (“approved” or “rejected”) without having paid the correspond-
ing contribution. In order to solve this issue, Parra-Moyano and Ross (2017) propose that all the FIs
that work with a customer must pay the corresponding portion of the KYC process to a smart contract
in order to appear in the list of onboarding institutions. This setup ensures that the TTP can always
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conduct controls in order to verify that all necessary contributions have been paid by all those FIs that
are benefiting from a KYC process or update carried out by another FI. This is, however, an artificial
and not an intrinsic incentive for participating FIs: they could choose not to pay the contribution if
they know that the TTP might not control all transactions for all customers. In order to transform this
artificial incentive into an intrinsic one, we make use of a distributed database architecture, which allows
us to eliminate the TTP and ensure that only FIs that have paid their proportion of the cost can actually
read information regarding the customer.
Respecting the contribution structure derived by Parra-Moyano and Ross (2017), the system we propose
here would allow all the FIs working with a customer to proportionally share the cost of the onboarding
process because they would all pay mk  m, being m the cost of onboarding process and k the number of
FIs working with the customer.
Once a second institution—Bank B, in this case—has followed the steps necessary to verify that a cus-
tomer has already been onboarded, two possible situations might arise. Either no update or correction
to the document package of this customer is required (as suggested by Parra-Moyano and Ross (2017))
or—and this is the more likely case—a KYC update process must be followed by Bank B in order to
comply with the national regulatory regime. If no update is required, the payment structure remains as
presented so far. If Bank B must pay the contribution m2 to the Home Bank via the smart contract and
at the same time realizes—after checking the document package—that an update is required, the Home
Bank (and, later in the process when multiple FIs have worked with the customer, all those FIs that have
previously worked with this customer) must somehow be informed of this and must also proportionally
contribute to the cost of the update process—a process that Bank B will carry out and from which the
Home Bank is (and later, all relevant FIs are) going to benefit. In order to allow for the sharing of updated
information and to enable a dynamic but private communication and compensation channel connecting
FIs, we define a further variable—namely, c—which represents the “Cost of Update”. We assume that
c < m, because when following the update process Bank B already possesses the previously available
information and does not need to start from scratch. Nevertheless, c, can be subject to specific factors
and conditions. Were this the case, the situation would then look as follows:
1) Bank B would have to pay the contribution m2 to the Home Bank via the smart contract and would
also realize that an update process is required in order for it to comply with the regulatory regime.
2) Bank B would follow the update process and would generate a digitally signed document that in-
dicates the process’ outcome, which again can be either “approved” or “rejected”.
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3) Bank B would store all the documents used in the KYC process as an “updated document pack-
age” in its own database. This updated document package would now be readable by all those FIs that
are listed in the smart contract and that have, directly or indirectly, paid for the update (at this stage,
Bank B and the Home Bank).
4) Since Bank B has carried out the update process and borne its costs, the appropriate proportions
of these costs must be paid by the institution(s) listed in the list of onboarding institutions (at this stage
only the Home Bank) to Bank B.
In order to ensure that step four is respected, we suggest a time lag (or block sequence that needs
to be added to the blockchain) between the moment at which an FI, k, other than the Home Bank pays
its contribution mk , via the smart contract and the moment at which the previous k  1, institutions can
redeem the corresponding funds from their accounts. This time lag enables us to ensure that if an update
to the KYC process needs to be carried out by the most recent FI that onboards the customer (the FI
paying mk to each FI that previously worked with that customer), a proportional part of the update costs
is deducted from the original mk contribution paid by the FI conducting that update. All the FIs working
with the customer thus contribute to the cost of this KYC update and pay an amount equal to mk   ck
. The system thus guarantees that all participating FIs that work with a given customer have access to
the most recent, updated version of the document package.
This procedure for immediate and automatic proportional cost sharing also allows all FIs to have ac-
cess to the most recent documents at all times. Assuming that k FIs have onboarded a given customer
prior to an update being required, the FI that carries out the KYC update process assigns a value cto
the update. This value represents the amount, in monetary terms, that the FI has spent on the update.
All other k   1 FIs are then required to pay ck , which they transfer to the FI that has carried out the
update. In this setup, the total cost of onboarding and updating the customer, m+c is proportionally dis-
tributed among the k FIs, which pay mk +
c
k each. This process is repeated each time an update is required.
We acknowledge that the implementation of this update-costs element depends on agreement among
participating FIs with regard to which documents are being updated. The method applied in the PoC
presented in this paper assumes fixed update costs that are dependent on the initial KYC cost m. For
each smart contract there are three types of update cost that can be assigned to the update. Each type is a
fraction of the initial KYC cost. For purposes of illustration, we choose to use c = m2 , c =
m
4 , and c =
m
6 .
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After the update has been carried out and the update cost has been distributed proportionally among
all onboarding FIs, the total cost of the customer increases from m to m + c. Assuming that a total of
K FIs have access to the system, all new onboarding FIs are required to pay m+cj , where j = k + i and
i = {1, 2, ...,K   k}.
This system would respect the four (revised) assumptions and the four conditions that we define ear-
lier in this section, and would constitute a significant improvement—in terms of eﬃciency, applicability,
incentive structure, and maintenance costs—over all the previous solutions that propose improving the
KYC process by means of DLT.
2.6.3 Technical Description of the Optimized, Dynamic KYC Process
This section shows how we implemented the desired properties of the smart contract as functions pro-
grammed in Solidity, a programming language for smart contracts deployed on the Ethereum network.
Here we describe the essential code for the implementation of the proposed system. The proposed system
relies on two smart contracts: the KYC smart contract and the token smart contract. For the token
smart contract an open-source code based on ERC-20 recommendations is used (Buterin and Voglsteller,
2015). We made slight adjustments to the ERC-20 code to simplify communications between the two
smart contracts.
The smart contract tracks the FIs addresses, the amount of tokens each FI transfers to the contract,
and the hash imported initially or updated as a struct Bank.
Figure 10: Smart Contract Structure.
The system records the FIs that have onboarded the customer in a list of addresses as banks_ids.
banks_ids is what we have referred to as the list of onboarding institutions in previous sections. When
a customer is added to the network the FI that carries out the initial KYC process creates the smart
contract for that customer. The PoC uses a separate smart contract to deploy the smart contract used
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for KYC purposes. The deployment smart contract uses a function deployContract that takes as input
the parameters necessary to deploy the KYC smart contract.
Figure 11: Deployment Smart Contract.
The necessary inputs required by deployContract are the address of the customer (newAddress), the
cost of the customer ($typeOf$), the address of the FI (_bankAddress), the hash of the KYC documents
($\_hash$), and the address of the token smart contract (tokenAddress). The token contract, as well as
all the code, can be consulted in the GitHub Repository “KYC-Optimized-and-Dynamic-System-using-
Blockchain-Technology (Tth2549, 2017).
The deployment smart contract uses its inputs to deploy the KYC smart contract as checkHash. The
checkHash smart contract uses an initializing function to store the required information and transfer the
ownership of the smart contract from the FI to the customer.
The initializing function is only called when the smart contract is created. After ownership has been
transferred the function calls storeProof to store the hash in the smart contract initializing function.
Next, the FI is added to banks_ids and the hash is linked to the FI to record what hash the first FI
imported. Further, the function uses the input typeOf to set the cost of the customer. Note that in this
PoC we assume that there only exist three types of customers, which cost 100,000, 200,000, and 300,000
tokens, respectively. These values were chosen arbitrarily for illustration purposes.
The customer is registered as the owner of the contract and therefore reserves the right to erase/kill
the smart contract. To do this the customer needs to approach an FI that has access to the network.
Ownership of the contract is then transferred from the customer to that FI so the function kill can be
called and the contract erased.
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Figure 12: Smart Contract initializing Function.
After the KYC smart contract has been successfully deployed, it can be used by other FIs. The smart
contract has a function, payment, that can be called by any FI. The payment function is used to inform
FIs of the sum they must pay in order to interact with the smart contract.
49
Figure 13: Smart Contract Function transferOwnership.
The payment function simply takes the cost of the customer and divides it by the number of FIs that have
previously onboarded that customer plus one. If the FI accepts the amount to be paid, it can proceed
to pay the given amount and use the smart contract further. The smart contract uses two functions to
transfer the tokens—tokenFallback and payContract. The function tokenFallback stores the tokens in
the smart contract and then uses payContract to distribute these tokens accordingly to other FIs.
Figure 14: Smart Contract Function transferOwnership.
Note that only after the tokenFallback function has verified that the amount transferred to the smart
contract is correct does it call payContract.
Figure 15: Smart Contract Function tokenFallback.
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Figure 16: Smart Contract Function payContract.
The function payContract uses a simple loop to transfer the payment to all previous FIs. Note that
the function tokenFallback adds the new FI to the list of onboarding institutions, banks_ids, after the
payContract function has been called. After the FI has paid the contract and the payment has been dis-
tributed, the FI can use the function checkDocument to compare the hash stored in the smart contract
to the hash it has generated from the documents supplied by the customer.
Figure 17: Smart Contract Function checkDocument.
The function checkDocument uses the modifier alreadyPaid to ensure that the FI calling it is on the
list of onboarding institutions—that is to say, that the FI has already paid its share.
Figure 18: Smart Contract Modifier alreadyPaid.
If the FI has paid its share, checkDocument converts the input hash to the same format as the hash
stored in the smart contract, using proofFor.
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Figure 19: Smart Contract Function proofFor.
Further, the function hasProof is used by the smart contract to compare the hash that results from
hashing this document with the hash stored in the smart contract.
Figure 20: Smart Contract Function hasProof.
The hasProof function has three possible returns: “Data is correct!” if the hash is a match, “Data is
old, has been approved before” if the hash that the FI is comparing has been updated by another FI and
the new FI is using old documents, and “Data has never been approved!” if the hash does not match and
has never been used before. If the documents used for the KYC process need to be updated, the FI can
update the hash in the smart contract using the function notarize.
Figure 21: Smart Contract Function notarize.
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Notarize converts the hash of the updated document to SHA256 and then adds the new, resulting hash
to storage in the smart contract using storeProof. The function notarize notes which FI updated the
hash so there is a record of which FI has imported each specific hash. Additionally, the function keeps
track of all the hashes used for the customer, in storeProof.
Figure 22: Smart Contract Function storeProof.
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper we propose a refined, dynamic, blockchain-technology-based KYC system that reduces the
costs of the KYC process, allows these costs to be shared proportionally by participating FIs, eliminates
the need for a TTP to manage permissions in the system, and conducts dynamic updates with regard
to the status of FIs’ customers over time. Further, we develop a PoC that can be used by FIs and
regulators to implement the proposed system and to explore variations of the system. This system is
based on previous system proposals and emerged through the application of DSR. Specifically, the system
development process employed a series of loops of design, evaluation, and demonstration that served to
improve the system’s applicability to a real-life corporate environment and to resolve the ineﬃciencies of
previously proposed systems.
The major contribution of the system we propose has been that it eliminates the need for a TTP,
making the system truly decentralized, and that it makes possible a distributed data storage architecture
that is independent of the blockchain architecture, which makes implementation more cost eﬃcient and
easier for FIs. In our system the blockchain is only used to grant and manage the distributed database’s
reading permissions. This strengthens the incentive structure for participating FIs, ensuring that they
act in the way in which they are meant to act because of an intrinsic impulse and not simply due to
the fear of being supervised by the regulator. Our system has made another vital contribution in that it
allows each participating FI to dynamically update each customer’s status, such that if an FI identifies—
for example—a flaw with regard to the legality of a customer’s activities, it can revise that customer’s
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status and propagate this information through the system to those other FIs that work with that cus-
tomer. The implications of this are, in fact, crucial because this feature not only allows FIs to revise
the status of any given customer, it also increases the quality of the information—in the form of KYC
documentation—available to the network, which ensures that all participating FIs remain up-to-date in
terms of the validity of the KYC status of any customer.
Additionally, we prove the concept by means of an artifact—coded in the language Solidity—that can be
easily used by any interested individual to test and develop the concept, implement it in an experimental
environment, and further develop it and adapt it in order improve its applicability and usefulness. We are
convinced that the conceptual system and the PoC that we propose here can serve to improve the existing
KYC process and that they constitute one necessary further step toward the adoption of blockchain-based
systems in the corporate environment.
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Abstract
The probability of a miner finding a valid block in the bitcoin blockchain is assumed to follow the
Poisson distribution. However, simple, descriptive, statistical analysis reveals that blocks requiring a
lot of time to find–long blocks–are won only by miners with a relatively higher hash power per second.
This suggests that relatively bigger miners might have an advantage with regard to winning long blocks,
which can be understood as a sort of “within block learning”. Modelling the bitcoin mining problem as a
race, and by means of a multinomial logit model, we can reject that the time spent mining a particular
block does not aﬀect the probability of a miner finding a valid version of this block in a manner that is
proportional to her size. Further, we postulate that the probability of a miner finding a valid block is
governed by the negative hypergeometric distribution. This would explain the descriptive statistics that
emerge from the data and be aligned with the technical aspects of bitcoin mining. We draw an analogy
between bitcoin mining and the classical “urn problem” in statistics to sustain our theory. This result
can have important consequences for the miners of proof-of-work cryptocurrencies in general, and for the
bitcoin mining community in particular.
Keywords: Blockchain, Bitcoin, Discrete Choice Modeling
Note : A version of this paper is available as Parra Moyano, J. Reich, G., and Schmedders, K., Urns
Filled with Bitcoins: New Perspectives on Proof-of-Work Mining, SSRN, 2019, doi:
https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3399742.
3.1 Introduction
Bitcoin is the electronic peer-to-peer currency, payment, and economic system first proposed by Nakamoto
(2008) that has since its introduction attracted the attention of scholars and practitioners. The paper by
Nakamoto (2008) opened a new stream of research in the literature and gave rise to both the industry of
“blockchain”—the underlying technology behind bitcoin—and “cryptocurrencies”. The market capitaliza-
tion of bitcoin and all existing cryptocurrencies reached 800 billion US dollars in 2018 (CoinMarketCap,
2019) and the size of the blockchain technology market is predicted to reach an annual value of more than
23 billion US dollars by 2023 (Grand View Research, 2018).
One of the properties that made bitcoin unique at the time of its introduction was the fact that it uses
a system called “mining”, which is conducted by machines that implement the bitcoin protocol and are
called “miners” in order to reach a secure, tamper-resistant consensus with regard to the transactions
made in the system, as well as to generate and introduce new bitcoins—units of the currency—into the
system (Antonopoulos, 2014). Miners conduct a trial-and-error process to find a “valid” block—a piece
of information that is linked to the past history of all the bitcoin transactions and that, among other
things, generates a predefined number of new bitcoins. The probability of a miner finding a valid block
is determined by her individual “hash rate per second” (the number of trials that she can conduct per
second) and the mining difficulty, D, which is a predefined number that is computed to keep the average
time required until any of the participating miners finds a valid block at 10 minutes. Each block contains a
reference to all the previous blocks that have been found. This forces a chronological order on the mining
process and results in the fact that miners compete simultaneously to find a valid version of the “next
block”. The mining process resembles a race, in which miners compete to become the first to find the
next valid block. As soon as a miner finds the next valid block, the winning miner broadcasts the valid
block to all the other participating miners such that a new race containing this new valid block can start.
Miners can collaborate with each other by gathering in “mining pools”. For the sake of our analysis we use
“miner” whenever we refer to either a miner or a mining pool and “mining pool” when we refer specifically
to a mining pool.
It is broadly accepted that the probability of finding a valid block—the “arrival rate” of valid blocks—is
a Poisson process (Bowden, Keeler, Krzesinski, & Taylor, 2018). This is assumed by authors including
Nakamoto (2008), Rosenfeld (2011), Eyal and Sirer (2013), Decker and Wattenhofer (2013), Rosenfeld
(2014), A. K. Miller and LaViola (2014), Sapirshtein, Sompolinsky, and Zohar (2015), Go¨bel, Keeler,
Krzesinski, and Taylor (2015), Lewenberg, Bachrach, Sompolinsky, Zohar, and Rosenschein (2015), Houy
(2016), Cocco and Marchesi (2016), Solat and Potop-Butucaru (2016), Beccuti and Jaag (2017), Chiu and
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Koeppl (2017), Dimitri (2017), Aggarwal, Brennen, Lee, Santha, and Tomamichel (2018), L. Cong, Li,
and Wang (2018), Hayes (2019), Easley, O’Hara, and Basu (2019), L. W. Cong, He, and Li (2019), and
Wang et al. (2019). The assumption that the mining process follows the Poisson distribution implies that
the miners’ probabilities of winning remain constant throughout the race (i.e., throughout the time that
elapses between the moment at which a miner starts trying to find the next valid block and the moment
at which any miner finds and broadcasts that valid block). This also means that two miners with identical
and constant hash rates per second have identical and constant probabilities of winning throughout the
race, regardless of the moment at which they start mining and regardless of the number of failed trials
they have previously conducted for this particular block. Or, phrased differently, the assumption implies
that the length of the race (the time that passes between the moment at which a miner starts mining a
particular block and that at which a valid version of this block is found) does not influence the probability
of the miner winning. This assumption is used by the Bitcoin protocol to set the mining difficulty, D,
which determines the expected time required until a valid block is found. This assumption is also used
by all the miners that can participate in the mining process in order to determine their expected returns
on mining and hence to decide whether to participate in the mining process or not (entry–exit decision).
Further, this assumption is used by cryptocurrency exchanges to estimate the hash rate of mining pools,
and by cryptographers to determine the security level of all bitcoin-like (proof-of-work) blockchains. We
theorize and suggest, however, that the probability of winning a block increases during the time that a
miner spends mining this block. This implies that the probability of winning a block does not follow
the Poisson distribution and we suggest that it could follow the negative hypergeometric distribution
instead. We test our postulate by means of a multinomial logit model similar to the one used by Bolton
and Chapman (1986) to model horse races and conclude that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the
probability of winning a block increases along the time that a miner spends mining this block. This result
implies that the probability of winning varies throughout the time that miners are mining the same block,
that bigger miners have a higher probability of winning longer blocks (or races), that it might be in the
interest of smaller miners to stop mining when they reach a certain time threshold, that cryptocurrency
exchanges need to change the way in which they calculate mining pools’ hash rates and “luck”1, and that
the way in which the Bitcoin difficulty, D, is determined needs to be adapted. Further, it implies that the
expected return on mining for relatively small miners is smaller than is assumed, whereas the expected
return on mining for relatively large miners is higher than is assumed. That the probability of winning a
block follows the hypergeometric distribution is a plausible explanation to this phenomenon.
In Section 3.2 we describe the fundamentals of the mining processes of bitcoin as well as the observations
1Pool luck is a parameter that emerges from the difference between the expected success rate of mining (given the hash
power) and the observed success rate of mining.
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and assumptions made by other scholars with regard to the mining process following the Poisson distri-
bution. Further, we propose and explain why we consider that the mining processes follows the negative
hypergeometric distribution, making an analogy between bitcoin mining and the classical “urn problem”
in statistics. In Section 3.3 we describe the data that we use and present the descriptive statistics that
motivate our postulate. In Section 3.4 we present the multinomial logit model that we use to model the
bitcoin mining process. In Section 3.5 we show the results of the estimation. In Section 3.6 we discuss the
implications of our results and we conclude.
3.2 Bitcoin Mining
In this section we briefly describe the concept of hashing, we present the fundamentals of bitcoin mining,
we describe the assumptions scholars make in order to conclude that the arrival rate of valid blocks follows
the Poisson distribution, and we describe why we consider that the probability of winning a block could
in fact follow the negative hypergeometric distribution.
3.2.1 Fundamentals of the SHA-256 Function
The SHA-256 (Secure Hash Algorithm 256) function is a cryptographic, one-way compression function.
The domain of the SHA-256 function is composed by any string of length up to 264 bits. This implies that
the domain of the SHA-256 function contains 2(2
64−1) possible, different inputs. This is the set of possible
inputs to the function. The range (support) of the SHA-256 function encompasses 2256 possible 256-bit
strings. All the strings that result from the SHA-256 function have a length of 256 bits. The result of
a hashing function is called a “hash”. The SHA-256 function is deterministic, such that the same input
always yields the same output. Altering one bit in the input passed through a hashing function completely
alters the resulting output. The SHA-256 function is a one-way function, which means that the original
data can not be retrieved from the resulting data (i.e., in order to find the input that yields a particular
output, only a trial-and-error process can be conducted). Since the SHA-256 function cannot be inverted,
it is impossible to anticipate which input is going to yield a particular output. Courtois, Grajek, and Naik
(2014a) describe further details of the SHA-256 function applied to the context of bitcoin mining.
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Figure 24: Illustration of the domain and range of the SHA-256 function.
3.2.2 Fundamentals of Bitcoin Mining
The underlying technology behind bitcoin is called the blockchain. A blockchain is a peer-to-peer ledger
that stores information in packages called blocks. Every block is linked to each other block by containing
the hash that results from hashing the previous block. Blocks have a size limit set to 1 MB 2. As explained
by Courtois, Grajek, and Naik (2014b), blocks contain the following information:
• Version number: An integer representing the version number of the bitcoin software. This number
defines the rules governing the blocks.
• The hash of the previous block: All the input of the previous block is hashed, such that the
resulting hash can be included in the current block. This links each block with the previous one.
• The Merkle root: A Merkle root is part of a Merkle tree and makes a reference to the transactions
that are stored in this block. The Merkle root can be understood as an aggregated hash of all the
transactions contained in the block. It is important to note that one of the transactions stored in
the block is written by the miner writing the block itself. This transaction is the transaction that
creates and assigns the new bitcoins to the miner itself writing the block. This is the way in which
miners are compensated for their mining costs.
• Timestamp: The time at the moment at which the block was written.
2Due to the Segregated Witness (SegWit) protocol upgrade implemented in 2017, blocks that are larger
than 1 MB are accepted if they fulfill a set of requirements. For more information on SegWit see
https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0141.mediawiki.
60
• Target: A global variable target, also known as Difficulty, D, that determines the blocks that will
be considered “valid”.
• Padding + Len: Two constants required by the SHA-256 hash function.
• Nonce: The nonce is a 32-bit number chosen by the miner.
The objective of miners is to take the inputs given by the network (the version number, the hash of the
previous block, the timestamp, the target, and the Padding + Len), incorporate the Merkle root with
transactions waiting to be included in the blockchain, hash it using the SHA-256 function, and hash the
resulting 256-bit string again using the same SHA-256 function, such that the second resulting hash starts
with a number of zeroes larger than that determined by the target (or Difficulty)3. As soon as a miner
finds a nonce that, together with the input given by the network and the information that she has written,
is hashed twice and yields a 256-bit string starting with the minimum accepted amount of zeroes, she
has found a valid block. At the moment at which a miner finds a valid block, it is in her interest to
broadcast this valid block to the network such that the other miners can verify that the input and the
nonce provided by the winning miner, once hashed, in fact start with the desired number of zeroes and
accept the broadcasted block as valid. Once the block is accepted as valid, a new problem using the hash
of this newly accepted block as the one of the inputs for the next block starts for all the miners. Since the
SHA-256 function cannot be inverted, it is impossible to anticipate which input (which nonce) is going to
yield a particular output. This is the cornerstone of proof-of-work mining: miners have to take the input
given by the previous block, add the corresponding Merkle root as well as the further required information,
and try many different 32-bit random nonces such that once that they are hashed together (the nonce and
the rest of the information written in the block) twice, the result of the function yields a number starting
with at least a certain amount of zeroes. Should the nonces be exhausted for a potentially valid block, the
miner just includes a “superNonce” in the coinbase of the Merkle tree—a field that can be written, with
no format specification, by the miner—generating a new version of the potentially valid block. Then, the
miner repeats the process and can try a new set of nonces for this new potentially valid block. As explained
by Courtois et al. (2014a), since the size of this extraNonce is only limited by the size of block itself, it can
be as large as required as long as the block size is within protocol limits. Adding the extraNonce alters
the resulting hash of the block in which the miner is working without interfering with its correctness, and
therefore allows the miner to try a new set of 32-bit nonces to find a valid block.
The process of mining (this trial-and-error process of testing many different nonces such that the result
yields a number below a predefined threshold) is carried out by specialized hardware that consumes elec-
3There are methods to speed up this double-hashing procedure. See Hanke (2016) and Courtois et al. (2014b).
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tricity. The power of mining hardware is measured in hashes per second (i.e., the number of hashing
operations that the machine can achieve per second). Miners are motivated to mine due to the “block
reward” and “block fees”. The block reward is the amount of newly created bitcoins, defined by the
protocol, that the miner can create and assign to herself in a transaction written in each potentially valid
block. This transaction becomes effective and accepted by the network only if the potentially valid block
becomes effectively valid. Note that the transaction that creates these new bitcoins and assigns them to
the miner is one of the transactions that the miner writes in the block, such that this transaction is part
of the Merkle tree contained in each block4. Further, the transactions that are made by bitcoin wallets
and that are sent to the so-called mempool for the miners to pick them and include them in their blocks
can contain a fee that goes to the miner who includes them in a valid block. Hence, once a miner finds
a valid block, she receives the newly created bitcoins and the fees of the transactions that she includes in
her block.
Figure 25 illustrates the creation of a block. In Figure 25 three miners are competing to find the next valid
block—namely, Miner A, Miner B, and Miner C. The last valid block found in this example is Block 8.
Each of the three miners uses the hash of Block 8, together with the target, the version, and the Padding
+ Len, in order to write a potentially valid block. A potentially valid block is a block that fulfills all the
requirements to be a valid block with the exception of the nonce. The potentially valid blocks written by
each miner are different from each other because despite the fact that the target, the hash of the previous
block, and the version and the Padding + Len are the same for all, each miner writes a different timestamp,
and includes a different set of transactions (different Merkle root) on it. Once each miner has written a
potentially valid block, she tries different nonces until the hash of the hash of a version of the potentially
valid block starts with the required number of zeroes. Once this occurs, the hash of this block (Block 9 in
our example) becomes, together with the target, the version, and the Padding + Len, the common basis
for all the miners to write (each of them) their next potentially valid block (Block 10 in our example).
Mining is a random process. Miners take the last valid block, use it to write a new block that contains
the required information, include a nonce in the block, and hash the block twice, hoping to get a valid
hash (with at least as many zeroes as required by the target). If miners don’t succeed in this process, they
increment the nonce by one, add it again to the block, and hash that new block twice trying to get a valid
hash at this new attempt. This process is repeated continuously until a hash less than the target value
is found by any participating miner. Miners therefore follow a stochastic process to find valid blocks, in
which they write a block and then start hashing the block with different nonces or superNonces until a
4The amount of the reward started at 50 bitcoins and is halved every 210,000 blocks. This occurs approximately every
four years.
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Figure 25: Illustration of the blockchain and the different versions of a block that can become the next
valid block.
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valid block is found. Miners don’t try the same nonce with the same block twice since they already know
that it results in an invalid hash.
3.2.3 Bitcoin Mining as a Poisson Process
Nakamoto (2008) introduces bitcoin and the process of creating new units of the cryptocurrency by hashing
the previous block and comparing the result to a certain threshold. He suggests—though he does not
explicitly state—that valid blocks are found according to the Poisson distribution. Probability events
that follow the Poisson distribution can occur n times in an interval. The average number of events in
an interval is designated by λ, which is also called the rate parameter. In the Poisson distribution the
probability of observing k events in an interval is given by the equation
P (k) = e−λ
λk
k!
.
As described by Rosenfeld (2011), the bitcoin protocol sets the target value (the minimum number of zeroes
with which a hash will be considered valid) such that every hash has a probability 2
16−1
D248 of yielding a valid
block. For the sake of simplicity, we—like other scholars—approximate this value by 1D232 . This implies
that the Poisson parameter that determines the probability of winning of miner i over time t expressed in
seconds (the probability of finding a valid block after mining for time t) can be written as
λi =
hit
D232
,
hit being the hash rate of miner i and D the Difficulty parameter. Therefore, a miner i mining at a
rate of hi hashes per second for time t (time expressed in seconds) has an expected rate of winning
hit
D232 . This assumption is used by many scholars to study different aspects of the bitcoin network. Eyal
and Sirer (2013) study the incentive structures for selfish mining in the Bitcoin network (a process tried
by some miners to leverage the time advantage they have when they find a valid block) and directly
assume the Poisson distribution for the arrival rate of blocks. Decker and Wattenhofer (2013) study the
propagation of transactions and blocks through the bitcoin network in order to understand the creation of
forks. In their analysis they specifically state that the proof-of-work mining process is a Poisson process,
in which the time difference between blocks follows an exponential distribution. Rosenfeld (2014) states
that while the qualitative nature of bitcoin mining is well understood, there is widespread confusion about
its quantitative aspects and how they relate to attack vectors and their countermeasures. He looks at the
stochastic processes underlying typical attacks and their resulting probabilities of success, assuming again
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that the number of blocks found by miners follows the Poisson distribution. A. K. Miller and LaViola
(2014) present a formal model of anonymous, synchronous processes that communicate using one-way
public broadcast, showing that the Bitcoin protocol achieves consensus using this model. For their proofs,
they assume that the total number of puzzle solutions found by the network (i.e., the total number of
valid blocks found by a miner) follows the Poisson distribution. Go¨bel et al. (2015) study the effect of
propagation delay on the evolution of the Bitcoin network, and use a spatial Poisson process model to
study the values computed by Eyal and Sirer (2013). Lewenberg et al. (2015) describe that if blocks in
a blockchain (bitcoin or others) are created at a high rate compared to their propagation time in the
network, many conflicting blocks are created, which can negatively affect the transaction throughput of
the system; they also propose an alternative structure to the chain that allows for operation at higher
rates. For both their analysis and their solution, they assume the Poisson distribution for the arrival
rate of blocks. Houy (2016) deals with the mining incentives in the Bitcoin protocol, which he defines
as a speed game between the miners, which differ from each other in terms of the computational power
(hash rate per second) with which they try to find a valid block. In his definition of their game, as well
as in the analytic search for Nash equilibria, he assumes that the process of finding a valid block can be
modelled as a random variable following the Poisson distribution. Cocco and Marchesi (2016) present an
agent-based artificial market model of the Bitcoin mining process, which they use to model the economy
of the mining process. They define the probability of mining a valid block as the relative hashing power of
the miner at every point in time ri(t) divided by the total hashing power of all the miners in the network
at the same time rTot(t), such that the number of bitcoins, b, that a miner can expect to mine is the
probability of winning multiplied with the total reward, B, of newly created bitcoins: b = ri(t)rTot(t)B. Note
that the probability of winning remains constant over time such that time plays no role in the expected
number of bitcoins won. Solat and Potop-Butucaru (2016) propose and theoretically analyze a solution
for the bitcoin selfish mining attack. They propose a solution to prevent such attacks by exploiting the
Poisson nature of the proof-of-work mining protocol. Beccuti and Jaag (2017) model the bitcoin mining
process as a game of imperfect information, in which miners have to choose whether or not to report
their success (selfish mining). They show that the game has a multiplicity of equilibria and that the
minimum requirement to find it optimal not to report a block decreases with the number of “selfish”
miners. For their analysis, they assume that success in bitcoin mining follows the Poisson distribution
with the parameter proposed by Rosenfeld (2011). Chiu and Koeppl (2017) study the optimal design
of cryptocurrencies and assess quantitatively how well such currencies can support bilateral trade. They
propose a design for cryptocurrencies that reduces mining and relies exclusively on money growth rather
than transaction fees to finance mining rewards. For the analysis of the optimality of their design they
assume that the probability of a miner finding a valid block is proportional to the fraction of computational
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power that that miner owns, utilizing the results of Rosenfeld (2011). Dimitri (2017) presents a game-
theoretic framework, assuming complete information in order to model Bitcoin mining. Among other
findings, he finds that in the unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the game the optimal amount
of energy consumption of miners depends on the reward for solving the puzzle (finding a valid block).
For the definition and the analysis of the game he assumes the same probability of winning as Rosenfeld
(2011). Aggarwal et al. (2018) investigate the exposure of Bitcoin, and other cryptocurrencies, to attacks
by quantum computers and suggest that the proof-of-work mining protocol used by Bitcoin is relatively
resistant to the threat posed by quantum computers’ substantial speedup, mainly because specialized ASIC
miners are extremely fast compared to the estimated clock speed of near-term quantum machines. For
the success rate of mining they take a probability of the same form as Rosenfeld (2011). L. Cong et al.
(2018) provide a dynamic asset-pricing model of cryptocurrencies. For their model, they define the law
of motion of token supply (the result of the mining process) as an exogenous stochastic Markov process.
They also present an alternative formulation in which the token supply follows the Poisson distribution,
as “seen in Bitcoin’s supply schedule”. They state that formulating the process as a Poisson process has
the advantage that equilibria between two Poisson arrivals still have only one state variable, which allows
the authors to solve the model by backward induction, starting from the asymptotic future where token
supply has plateaued and moving back sequentially in the Poisson time. Hayes (2019) proposes and tests a
cost-of-production model for valuing bitcoin. In order to calculate the expected number of bitcoins that a
miner can produce (which is crucial for the miner to decide whether she participates in the mining process
or not), he implicitly assumes the Poisson distribution for the arrival rate of blocks. Easley et al. (2019)
investigate the role that transaction fees play in the Bitcoin blockchain’s evolution from a mining-based
structure to a market-based economy. They do so by developing a game-theoretic model to explain the
factors leading to the emergence of transactions fees, as well as to explain the strategic behavior of miners
and users. Their model also highlights the roles played by mining rewards and by volume, and examines
how microstructure features such as exogenous structural constraints influence the dynamics and stability
of the Bitcoin blockchain. In order to do so, they assume that, independently, for each miner working on the
problem, valid blocks arrive according to the Poisson distribution. Wang et al. (2019) provide a systematic
vision of the organization of blockchain networks. By emphasizing the unique characteristics of incentivized
consensus in blockchain networks, their review of the existing consensus protocols is focused on both the
perspective of distributed consensus system design and the perspective of incentive mechanism design.
They also assume the arrival rate of blocks to follow the Poisson distribution. L. W. Cong et al. (2019)
study how the rise of centralized mining pools for risk sharing affect the relationships between competing
miners and the energy consumption of proof-of-work-based blockchains. They state that in proof-of-work
mining the probability of finding a solution is not affected by the number of trials previously attempted.
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This is what they call the “well-known ‘memoryless’ property” of proof-of-work mining, which “implies
that the event of finding a solution is captured by a Poisson process with the arrival rate proportional to
a miner’s share of hash rates globally” as described by Eyal and Sirer (2013) and Sapirshtein et al. (2015).
By assuming that the arrival rate of blocks follows the Poisson distribution, all these authors are assuming
(as nicely stated by L. W. Cong et al. (2019)) that mining is a “memoryless” process, and therefore that
the probability of finding a valid block is independent of the previously made attempts.
Grunspan and Perez-Marco (2017) correct the analysis given in Nakamoto (2008) regarding the success
of double-spend attacks on the bitcoin blockchain, and give a closed-form formula for the probability of
success of a double-spend attack. In doing so, they assume that the number of blocks N(t) mined at time
t follows the Poisson distribution. Grunspan and Perez-Marco (2017) do not revise or study the arrival
rate of blocks, but demonstrate that one of the characteristics of the bitcoin blockchain that emerges from
this arrival rate—namely, the success of double-spend attacks—differs from what was previously assumed
in the literature. Their work is especially important for us, since while it still accepts that the arrival rate
of blocks follows the Poisson distribution, it challenges the assumption implied by Nakamoto (2008) that
the success of a double-spend attack also follows the Poisson distribution.
Bowden et al. (2018) challenge the assumption of the block arrival rate following the Poisson distribution,
and based on a stochastic analysis of the block arrival process demonstrate that this is not the case. They
present a refined mathematical model for block arrivals, focusing on both the block arrivals during a period
of constant difficulty and how the difficulty level evolves over time. Their work leaves the question of “how
does the arrival rate of blocks really behave?” open.
3.2.4 Bitcoin Mining as a Negative Hypergeometric Process
The negative hypergeometric distribution arises in schemes of sampling without replacement. If in the total
population of size N there are M elements that are considered a “success” and N −M elements that are
consider a “failure”, and we sample elements out of the population without replacement until the number
of “successes” reaches a fixed number m, then the random variable X—the total number of “failures” in
the sample—follows the negative hypergeometric distribution X ∼ NHG (N, M, m). The probability mass
function (PMF) of a random variable X that follows the negative hypergeometric distribution is given by
Pr(X = k) =
(
k+m−1
k
)(
N−m−k
M−m
)(
N
M
) .
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Using the negative hypergeometric distribution, and X being a random variable counting the samples
number at which the k-th success is obtained when sampling without replacement from a set of N objects
of which M are considered a success, X follows a negative hypergeometric distribution. In that case, the
probability mass function is given by
Pr(X = x) =
(
M
k−1
)(
N−M
x−k
)(
N
x−1
) × (M − k + 1
N − x+ 1
)
.
For more details on the negative hypergeometric distribution see Johnson and Kotz (1969) and G. K. Miller
and Fridell (2007).
As we have described, a miner takes an input related to the past history of all transactions as given.
Further, she writes a block containing this input, as well as the additionally required data (Merkle tree,
timestamp, etc.). Once this information is written in the block, the miner includes a nonce in it and uses
all this data together as the input of the SHA-256 function. As a result of this hashing, the miner gets
one of the 2256 possible 256-bit strings that can result from the SHA-256 function. She then takes the
hash resulting from this operation and hashes it again in order to get another of the 2256 256-bit strings,
hoping that this second hash starts with the required number of zeroes. Whenever the second hash does
not fulfill the requirements of a valid block, the miner changes the nonce in the block and repeats the
double-hashing process. Since trying twice a nonce that results in no valid hash would represent a waste
of resources, miners do not repeat a nonce with the same block. Therefore, given the relevant information
written in a block, a miner tries successive nonces until she or another miner finds a valid block. Should
the nonces be exhausted, the miner just includes the previously described “superNonce” in the block and
repeats the process. This process is illustrated in Figure 26.
Both the domain and the range of the SHA-256 function are finite. Since miners conduct a double-hashing
process to find a valid block, and don’t repeat a nonce that is known to fail for a given block, we postulate
that the probability of finding a valid block increases with the number of previously tried nonces and,
therefore, the arrival rate of valid blocks follows the negative hypergeometric distribution, such that the
probability of a miner finding a valid block is not only be dependent on her hash rate but also on the
number of previously non-valid nonces found for this particular block. In other words, we postulate that
while proof-of-work mining is still a “memoryless” process between blocks, this does not hold within blocks.
68
Figure 26: Illustration of the finite domains and ranges of the double-hashing process conducted by
bitcoin miners using the SHA-256 function.
Proposition 1 The number of nonces that needs to be tried until the first valid block is found is a random
variable X that follows the negative hypergeometric distribution X ∼ NHG (N, M, 1), with N being the
number of potentially valid blocks and M the number of potentially valid blocks that, hashed twice, result
in a hash below the target.
In the context of Bitcoin mining, the number of objects with the winning feature equal to M is the
number of hashes that start with the required number of zeroes out of all the possible inputs to the SHA-
256 function, N , that are contained in the domain of the SHA-256 function5. Both N and M are fixed.
N equals 2256 and M is fixed for each block since the Difficulty, D, that determines it is contained in the
header of the block and given by the protocol for each block. The number of draws m made by a miner
is the number of nonces tried for a particular block that result in a non-valid hash. No nonce that has
previously resulted in a non-valid hash is repeated. The number of observed successes m is set to one since
nonces are tried one after the other and as soon as a valid one is found the problem is solved and miners
stop trying to find a valid nonce for their block.
5Given the fact that miners conduct double-hashing, we could argue that N is the range of the SHA-256 function and
not its domain. This does not alter our result, due to the fact that the SHA-256 function is deterministic. Further, since
the domain of the SHA-256 function is significantly bigger than its range, one could postulate that collisions will occur. In
the context of the SHA-256 function a collision would occur whenever two different inputs to the SHA-256 function (two
elements of its huge domain containing 264
2−1 elements) yield the same hash (one of the elements in the huge but smaller
range of the function, which contains 2256 elements). While this is theoretically possible given the fact that the SHA-256
function is non-injective, collisions have not yet been observed. The SHA-256 function is assumed to be surjective but this
has not yet been proven.
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Proposition 2 The probability mass function of finding a valid block on the xth attempt is given by
Pr(X = x) =
(
N−M
x−1
)(
N
x−1
) × ( M
N − x+ 1
)
,
with N being the number of potentially valid blocks and M the number of potentially valid blocks that,
hashed twice, result in a hash below the target.
Should this be the case, the probability of finding a valid block would increase with the number of failed
attempts for this block, such that the longer it takes to find a block (i.e., the longer the time that has
elapsed since the broadcasting of the last block), the higher the probability of success of bigger pools
(pools that can conduct more hashes per second) compared to that of smaller pools. This would occur
since bigger miners could increase their probability of winning faster than smaller miners, following the
PMF described in Proposition 2.
3.2.5 Resemblance between Bitcoin Mining and the Urn Problem
In probability and statistics, an urn problem is a thought experiment in which an event (e.g., success)
and its complement (e.g., no success) are represented, respectively, by balls of two different colors (e.g.,
white balls for success and black balls for no success) contained in an urn. In this thought experiment, an
individual draws balls from the urn until she draws a ball of the color she is looking for (white). In the
easiest version of the experiment, the individual has two options when drawing a ball of the color that
does not represent the event that she is looking for: either return the (black) ball to the urn, or not return
it to the urn. In the first case, the probability of drawing a ball representing the event (a white ball in our
example) remains constant throughout the many consecutive unsuccessful events due to the fact that the
individual always returns a ball representing a lack of success (the black ball in our example) to the urn,
leaving the probability of success constant across successive attempts. However, in the second case, the
probability of drawing a ball representing the event (a white ball in our example) does not remain constant
across the many consecutive unsuccessful events due to the fact that the individual does not return a ball
representing a lack of success (the black ball in our example) to the urn, therefore altering the proportion
of successful events in the urn after each draw. The first case is called “drawing with replacement” whereas
the second case is called “drawing without replacement”. In the case of “drawing without replacement”, in
which balls representing unsuccessful events are not returned to the urn, the probability of drawing a ball
representing a success after a fixed number of failures follows the negative hypergeometric distribution. See
G. K. Miller and Fridell (2007) for more details about the urn problem and the negative hypergeometric
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distribution.
The process of proof-of-work mining resembles a classical urn problem in which an urn contains balls
(inputs to the SHA-256 function) that result in either a valid hash (success) or a non-valid hash (failure).
Each miner is confronted with such an urn and successively tries inputs (which are in fact nonces for a
particular potentially valid block) until she has found a valid one (success). Since nonces known to yield a
non-valid hash for a particular potentially valid block are not tried twice, this problem resembles the urn
problem “without replacement”, in which balls representing a failure event are not returned to the urn.
Since miners conduct a double-hashing process, the structure of the problem is slightly more complex,
while at the end it simplifies to the classical urn problem due to the fact that the SHA-256 function is
deterministic. First, a miner tries a nonce for a given potentially valid block (draws a ball) out of the set
of 264
2−1 possible elements in the domain of the SHA-256 function. In the context of the urn problem,
she first draws a ball from an urn with 264
2−1 balls. The real space from which the miner samples is
nevertheless way smaller since it is restricted to the space that contains a potentially valid block. Out
of the urn she can get one of 2256 results that are contained in the range of the SHA-256 function. We
could say that each of these 2256 is a different color (or a number). Regardless of the result of the first
hash, the miner hashes the result of the first hashing process and gets the final hash that can be either
valid or non-valid. Should the resulting second hash be non-valid, the miner will certainly not try again
the same nonce, which she now knows yields a non-valid hash. This is the same as not returning the ball
representing the non-success event to the urn.
3.3 Data
In this section we describe the data used to empirically study our proposition, and present descriptive
statistics that motivate our postulate.
3.3.1 The Bitcoin Blockchain Data
We downloaded all the information about the blockchain available at www.blockchair.com for the blocks
1 to 555,116. These blocks represent the period between January 3, 2009 and December 28, 2018. The
raw data contains the following information for each of the blocks: block number, hash of the block, time
and date at which the block was mined, the miner (mining pool) that won the block if it is identified, and
other metrics about the fees, transactions, and size of the block. An example, for the first and last blocks,
is depicted in Table 1.
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Block Nr Hash Miner Date Time
1 000...26f Unknown 2009-01-03 18:15
2 000...048 Unknown 2009-01-09 02:54
... ... ... ... ...
555,116 000...9b8 AntPool 2018-12-28 15:06
Table 4: Blockchain Data
Due to the nature of the blockchain, we only observe the miner that wins each block. We can observe
neither the hash power of the successful miner nor that of the miners that competed to find a valid version
of each block but did not succeed in finding it. Since we need the hash power of the miner in order to
relate it to the success of winning a block, we construct a proxy for it in the following manner. First,
we add a column to the dataset containing the date (natural day), such that we can observe how many
blocks were mined each day. This divides our dataset into 3,637 days and not into 3,646 days (the days
elapsed between January 3, 2009 and December 28, 2018) due to the fact that on some days (especially
at the beginning) no block was mined. Second, we take a sample of the original dataset, containing only
the blocks mined after block 278,310, such that we only take into account the blocks mined from January
2, 2014 onward. Our intention in taking this subset is to leave out of our analysis the initial years, during
which Bitcoin was not so well spread and no mining pools were formed, and to only start observing the
data after ASIC miners were really accessible to the public. Third, we eliminate all the blocks won by an
unknown miner. After conducting these steps, we assume that all the miners that have won a block on
one day have tried to mine all the blocks that have been mined on that particular day. This allows us to
compute the fraction of daily won blocks of each miner. This fraction is our proxy for the fraction of total
hash power that each miner uses in each natural day. This proxy contains noise. Since, however, (big)
mining pools remain stable and constantly mine blocks without disconnecting their hardware completely,
we consider it a sufficiently valid proxy for the purpose of this analysis.
By way of example, we can consider November 12, 2018 (2018-11-12), a day on which 110 blocks were
mined by identified miners (blocks mined by unknown miners were set aside). Table 2 summarizes which
miners won how many blocks on that day. We observe that the mining pool “AntPool” mined 22 blocks,
whereas the mining pool “BTC.COM” mined 21 blocks, the mining pool “F2Pool” 20 blocks, etc. From
these frequencies, we can calculate the proportion of blocks won by each miner on each day. For this
example, “AntPool” has a fraction of 0.2, which comes from dividing the number of blocks won by it on
that day (22) by the total amount of blocks mined that day (110). We take these fractions as a proxy for
the daily fraction of total hash power of each miner. While this proxy does not represent the true value
of the size of the miner in terms of hash power (the value, in fact, can change on a minute-by-minute or
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Date Pool Blocks SIZE Ranking
2018-11-12 AntPool 22 0.200 1
2018-11-12 BTC.COM 21 0.1909 2
2018-11-12 F2Pool 20 0.1818 3
2018-11-12 SlushPool 14 0.1273 4
2018-11-12 ViaBTC 11 0.1000 5
2018-11-12 BTC.TOP 7 0.0636 6
2018-11-12 BitFury 4 0.0364 7
2018-11-12 Bitcoin.com 3 0.0273 8
2018-11-12 DPOOL 3 0.0273 8
2018-11-12 Bitclub Network 2 0.0182 10
2018-11-12 58COIN 1 0.0091 11
2018-11-12 Eobot 1 0.0091 11
2018-11-12 KanoPool 1 0.0091 11
Table 5: Exemplary data subset for 2018-11-12
second-by-second basis), and it it assumes that hash power is the only factor explaining success in mining
(which is exactly the hypothesis that we want to reject), it is the best proxy we have been able to conceive
thus far.
From these fractions, which we will hereafter refer to as “size”, we can compute the ranking of the miner
in terms of size. We order the miners by their daily size, and for each day we assign the ranking with value
1 to the miner with the highest size, the ranking with value 2 to the miner with the second highest size,
etc. Should two miners have the same size (i.e., should we observe a tie), both miners get the smallest of
the possible rankings. If a tie occurs, the immediately smaller miner after the tied miners gets her true
corresponding ranking value (e.g., where both Bitcoin.com and DPOOL share the same size, both receive
the ranking value 8 and the Bitclub Network receives the value 10). Having calculated these values for each
miner and each day, we incorporate them into the original dataset, which also contains the time required
to mine each block, computed as the difference in seconds elapsed between the time of the previous block
and the current block.
3.3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Using our dataset, we plot the length of the block in seconds against the ranking of the miner that wins
that block. Figure 27 shows the result of this plot. Recall that the biggest miner of the day (i.e., the
miner with the estimated highest hash power on a given day) is the one with the ranking equal to 1.
Observing this plot it seems that longer blocks are won by relatively bigger pools (i.e., pools with higher
ranking places). In other words, it seems that very long blocks are not won by pools that have a lower
hash rate per second and that are therefore relatively smaller. If further statistical analysis confirms this
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observation, this will imply that there is a “learning” effect within blocks that is proportional to the size
of the miner in terms of hash power (i.e., that relatively bigger miners learn faster than relatively smaller
miners). One possible explanation for this phenomenon is that the probability of finding a valid block after
having found a set of non-valid blocks follows the negative hypergeometric distribution, such that bigger
pools’ probability of winning increases faster along the length of the block (time in seconds) than smaller
pools’ probability of winning, due to the fact that relatively bigger miners can try and fail faster (with a
higher hash rate per second) than smaller mining pools. Making an analogy with the urn problem, this
would mean that bigger pools draw more balls per second without replacement, such that their probability
of winning increases with time faster than is the case for relatively smaller miners.
In order to measure this effect, and given the fact that what we consider a “long” block can be arbitrary,
we plot—in Figure 28—the probability of the miner with ranking value 1 winning the block given that the
block is long. We set different values for what we consider a long block, starting at 575 seconds (the average
length of a block) and continuing in steps of 100 seconds until we reach a block time of 4,200 seconds. We
observe that the probability of winning of the biggest miner of the day, given that the block is long, tends
to increase with the length of the block that we consider “long”. This effect becomes visible at a block time
of at least 3,275 seconds. In other words, the advantage of the biggest miner starts becoming apparent
for blocks of a length equal to or higher than 3,275 seconds. From this length onward, the probability
of the miner with ranking 1 winning the block is higher than the probability of the same miner winning
any block. These probabilities emerge from the winning frequencies observed in the data and therefore
follow no arbitrary decision with regard to what a “long block” is. For illustrative purposes we also plot
the probability of the miner with the ranking equal to 1 winning any block and its 99 percent confidence
interval. This probability is represented by the straight line at 0.2536.
These plots motivate our work. Our aim is to learn if what we observe in the plots can be explained by
the theory postulated in Section 3.2.4 or if, on the contrary, the lack of relatively small miners winning
long blocks is just explained by the fact that since small miners by their very definition win less blocks, we
have not had enough blocks yet to observe small miners winning long blocks. Should we accept the theory
that we postulate in Section 3.2.4, our work could be seen as a tool with which to analyze if the negative
hypergeometric distribution that governs the probability of winning blocks can be well approximated by the
negative binomial distribution (urn problem with replacement), which is the case when N,M,N−M →∞,
such that M/N → p.
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Figure 27: Time required to mine the block vs the ranking of the mining pool in terms of hash power.
Period: 2014.01.02 until 2018.12.28.
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Figure 28: Probability of the biggest miner of the day winning, for different definitions of “long block”.
Period: 2014.01.02 until 2018.12.28.
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3.4 Statistical Model
Races in which only one of the participants can win have been broadly discussed in the literature. Such races
have similarities with uncertain future returns of investments. Authors, such as Snyder (1978), Hausch,
Ziemba, and Rubinstein (1981), Bolton and Chapman (1986), and Hausch, Lo, and Ziemba (2008), have
investigated the properties of horse race markets to determine the impact of the attributes of the horse and
of the race, on the probability of winning for each horse in each race. Bolton and Chapman (1986) present
a multinomial logit model to analyze the horse race process, recognizing that only a finite number of
mutually exclusive outcomes can occur per race—hat is to say, that one, and only one, of the participating
horses wins the race. We model the bitcoin mining process as a race with the same structure as the
horse race proposed by Bolton and Chapman (1986), such that we can determine the significant impact
of attributes of the miners (their size) and attributes of the race (the time required to mine a block) to
find out which of those attributes, individually or combined as interaction variables, have an impact on
the probability of winning of a particular miner in a particular block.
3.4.1 Stochastic Utility Model of the Mining Process
A bitcoin mining race can be understood as an event in which a decision maker—nature—chooses the
winning miner out of a pool of all competing miners. In each block, nature is confronted with a choice
set consisting of all the miners mining the block. Each miner i has a vector of S attributes associated
with it. In our case, this vector contains the size of the miner, and its ranking, as described in Section
3.3.1, denoted xi = [xi1, xi2, ..., xiS ]. The adequate parametrization of this choice model requires that
the estimated winning probabilities satisfy the standard axioms of non-negative probabilities. Further,
the sum of the probabilities of winninf of all the miners needs to be equal to one. The multinomial logit
model described below, which has the same structure as the one presented by Bolton and Chapman (1986),
fulfills these requirements. The fact that these requirements need to be fulfilled precludes a simple linear
regression model for the estimation since it would violate these probability axioms.
We assume the existence of a utility function U that measures the utility derived for nature by each of the
participating miners i winning the block. The utility of a miner in each block can be written as
Ui = U(xi).
Since there is always an error in the modelling process, which in our case, given the lack of adequate
data, can even be high, the attributes of the vector will not capture all the factors determining the choice.
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We therefore assume the overall utility of a miner to have two parts. The first part is the deterministic
component Vi = V (xi). The second part is a random component, i = (xi), which captures the errors
in the modelling process. If the stochastic error term is independent of its deterministic component, the
utility function U can be written as
Ui = Vi + i.
Since we have a stochastic error term in this equation, our model is a stochastic utility model. Using
this model, let us suppose that miner i∗ is observed to win a block. This is the same as observing nature
choosing miner i∗ out of the set of all miners mining a block. Since we are assuming that nature is rational,
nature chooses the miner with the highest utility for this block. Revealed preferences imply that Ui∗ ≥ Ui
for i = 1, 2, ..., I. Given that the utility function is partly stochastic, the probability of miner i∗ winning
a block can be written as
Pi∗ = Prob(Ui∗ ≥ Ui, i = 1, 2, ..., I).
If we assume that the stochastic error terms are identically and independently distributed (i.i.d.) according
to the double exponential distribution Prob(i ≥ ) = exp[−exp(−)], then the choice probability assumes
the closed-form expression of the multinomial logit model:
Pi∗ =
exp(Vi∗)∑I
i=1 exp(Vi)
for i∗ = 1, 2, ..., I.
3.4.2 Estimating the Parameters of the Multinomial Logit Model
The likelihood function associated with a set of blocks can be written for the multinomial logit model as
follows:
exp (L) =
J∏
j=1
Pjm∗,
where the subscript j denotes a block (j = 1, 2, ..., J), i∗ is the miner observed to win the block, and L
refers to the log-likelihood function.
3.5 Estimation
In this section we describe the data used for the model’s estimation, as well as the specification of the
model and its results.
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3.5.1 Data Used in the Model
The computation of the multinomial logit model requires observations of individuals making a choice about
an alternative. Both the individual and the alternatives available to the individual can have attributes
that explain the choice. In our context the block is the individual and the winning miner is the alternative.
We use the attributes of the alternative (the miner), and only those attributes of the individual (the block)
that interact with the attributes of the alternative. This is the exact same principle as the one used by
Bolton and Chapman (1986). In order to achieve this, we need to use a dataset containing the miner
that won the block as well as all the miners that are assumed to have participated in the mining process
of a particular block but did not win that block. This allows us to have different alternatives for each
(individual) block. For this computation we use the dataset described in Section 3.3, which contains all
blocks won by identified miners for the blocks 278,310 to 555,116.
3.5.2 Specification of the Model
We use the following form of the multinomial logit model in order to model the utility of each miner m:
Ui = θ1SIZEi + θ2SIZEi ∗ TIME.
The variable SIZEi is the estimated fraction of daily hash power for a miner that we derive as explained in
Section 3.3.1. We use SIZEi as a proxy for the miner’s size, measured as a fraction of the total hash power
of all miners. The miner’s size is assumed to be the main determinant of the mining outcome. Further,
we use the variable SIZEi∗TIME, which is the interaction of the block length in seconds with the size of
the miner. We include this variable in order to measure the impact on the likelihood of winning of the size
across time. In this model, the utility for nature of choosing each alternative depends on the attributes of
that alternative (the size of the miner), interacted with the attributes of the individual (the length of the
block).
A positive and significant coefficient for the variable SIZEi∗TIME would imply that we can reject that the
impact of the miner’s size on the likelihood of winning a block does not increase over time. In other words,
given the significance of the coefficient SIZE*TIME we can reject the hypothesis that the time elapsed since
the moment at which the miner starts mining a block does not increase miners’ probability of winning in a
manner that is proportional to their size. Hence, we would reject that a miner’s probability of winning for
a particular block does not increases with the number of previously tried and failed potentially valid blocks
(i.e., hashed blocks resulting in a hash above the target). Our postulate would be a possible explanation
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for this result. Should the coefficient for the variable SIZEi∗TIME be negative and/or non-significant, this
would lead to us not being able to reject that the impact of the miner’s size on the likelihood of winning
a block does not increase over time and therefore that the observations made in Section 3.3 emerge from
the fact that relatively smaller miners have still won too few blocks.
3.5.3 Results of the Estimation
The model was estimated using the blocks described in Section 3.5.1. The associated empirical results are
displayed in Table 1. The results of the estimation show both positive and significant coefficients for the
variables SIZEi and SIZEi∗TIME. The coefficients represent the impact of the variable in the log-odds of
each alternative being chosen. The estimate for SIZE is positive with a value of 17.223719 and significant
with a p-value of 0. This is obvious and was expected, due to the nature of bitcoin mining and also due to
the way in which we have built the proxy for the size. From these results we can infer that ceteris paribus,
an increase in the size of the miner (i.e., in her hash power) increases her log-odds of winning. The estimate
for SIZE*TIME is positive with a value of 0.0001398 and significant with a p-value of 0.0000638. This
implies that given the miner’s size, we can reject that her log-odds of winning do not increase with the
length of the block (i.e., we cannot reject that the log-odds of winning do not increase with time in a
manner that is proportional to the size). Since the positive impact of time (block length) on the log-odds
of winning interacts with the SIZE, we cannot reject that the log-odds of winning of a bigger miner do
not increase with time in a “faster” or “bigger” manner than those of a smaller miner. Such results reveal
that time plays a role in miners’ probability of winning. A possible explanation of this phenomenon is
Proposition 1 and Proposition 2.
Estimation Results
Attribute Estimate Std. Error P(> |z| )
SIZE 17.223719 0.0277041 0.0000000
SIZE*TIME 0.0001398 0.0000350 0.0000638
3.6 Discussion and Conclusion
The motivation to write this piece emerged while we were studying the “entry–exit” problem that miners
face when deciding which cryptocurrency to mine with their hardware. This entry–exit problem is governed
by the fixed cost of the mining hardware, the variable electricity cost of using the hardware, the expected
return in units of each cryptocurrency that can be mined, and the exchange rate of these cryptocurrencies
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to a fiat currency such as the US dollar. Since the expected return of units of the currency is determined by
a distribution that depends on the hash power, we started conducting basic descriptive statistics to better
understand our problem. These descriptive statistics—summarized in Section 3.3—seemed to contradict
the assumptions about the Poisson distribution for the arrival rate of blocks in proof-of-work protocols in
general and in bitcoin in particular, an assumption that is well established in the literature and that we
describe in Section 3.2. The descriptive statistics suggest that the probability of relatively bigger miners
finding longer blocks (longer in terms of the time required to find them) is higher than that of relatively
smaller miners. This suggests that there might occur a sort of “learning” when mining a particular block
and that relatively bigger miners learn faster than relatively smaller miners. Digging into the literature, we
found that recent work by Grunspan and Perez-Marco (2017) and Bowden et al. (2018) has already begun
to challenge the assumption of the arrival rate of blocks following the Poisson distribution. However, their
respective analyses focus on the security of the proof-of-work protocol and hence on the probability of
miners’ winning successive blocks. Puzzled by the apparent contradiction between the literature and the
statistics emerging from the data, we started revising proof-of-work mining from the basics, postulating
that, given a potentially valid block, the number of nonces that needs to be tried by a miner until the
first valid block is found is a random variable that follows the negative hypergeometric distribution. This
postulate is a possible explanation of the phenomenon observed in the data and is consistent with the
technical aspects of bitcoin mining. Further, the resemblance between the urn problem and proof-of-work
mining convinces us that this postulate has a theoretical foundation. Should our postulate be correct, it
would have serious implications for the way in which scholars and practitioners understand proof-of-work
mining. Having postulated this, a question of practical relevance emerged: Does the time that has elapsed
since the mining of a block began really play a role in miners’ probability of winning?
In order to answer this question, we studied the literature until we found a robust model that would be
suitable. Our intention was to measure if the time required to find a block (which represents the number
of non-valid nonces tried by a miner for a potentially valid block, given that hash power is measured in
hashes per second) had a positive and significant impact on the the likelihood of winning. The model used
by Bolton and Chapman (1986) to explain the winning alternative (horse) of a horse race seemed perfectly
suited to answering our question since the structure of our problem is the same as that of their problem.
The result of this model applied to our problem indicates that we can reject the hypothesis that the size of
a miner (her hash power) does not increase her her odds of winning in a way that is proportional to time
(i.e., in a way that is proportional to the time spent computing non-valid versions of a potentially valid
block). This suggests that the probability of a miner winning a block varies with the number of previously
tried and failed attempts for this block and that, therefore, there exists a sort of “learning” within blocks.
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Our postulate is a possible explanation for why this is the case.
This result has serious implications for the bitcoin and proof-of-work community. First, it shows that we
can still learn more about bitcoin mining. Second, it shows that smaller miners might have an incentive to
stop mining a block after trying for a specific time, since after this time their expected reward has decreased
so much that it does not compensate their costs. Third, it implies that the way in which platforms are
estimating the hash power of mining pools needs to be corrected in order to reflect the impact of time
on the success of mining. Fourth, it could be that our postulate explains the concept of mining “luck”,
since the deviation between the observed and expected performance of miners could be explained by the
incorrect approximation of hash power that is used to compute it.
Our results are, though, to be taken with caution. First, since we can only observe the winner of a block,
we can only infer which other miners participated in each block. Second, we observe no adequate metrics
for hash power and have to derive them from the already inferred and assumed participating miners.
Third, the way in which the data is generated implies that the error terms in the model that we use are
not i.i.d., which contradicts one of the assumptions of the multinomial logit model.
However, given the theoretical body of our work and the results that emerge from the model—even with
a compromised dataset—we conclude that there is enough theoretical and empirical material to sustain
that miners’ probability of winning does not remain constant over time and that a possible explanation
for this phenomenon is that the probability of a miner finding a valid block during a specific attempt
follows the negative hypergeometric distribution. This result might have important consequences for the
miners of proof-of-work cryptocurrencies in general, and for the miners of bitcoin in particular, as well
as for scholars studying cryptocurrencies. We urge the research and practitioner communities to start
thinking about mining from this new perspective. Further, we exhort mining pools to report the historical
hash power with which they have mined each cryptocurrency, and in a very precise and timely manner.
This would allow researchers to continue studying this phenomenon and keep expanding our knowledge of
proof-of-work mining.
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